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Abstract
Philosophical reflection on quantum field theory has tended to fo-
cus on how it revises our conception of what a particle is. However,
there has been relatively little discussion of the threat to the “reality”
of particles posed by the possibility of inequivalent quantizations of a
classical field theory, i.e., inequivalent representations of the algebra
of observables of the field in terms of operators on a Hilbert space.
The threat is that each representation embodies its own distinctive
conception of what a particle is, and how a “particle” will respond to
a suitably operated detector. Our main goal is to clarify the subtle
relationship between inequivalent representations of a field theory and
their associated particle concepts. We also have a particular interest
in the Minkowski versus Rindler quantizations of a free Boson field,
because they respectively entail two radically different descriptions of
the particle content of the field in the very same region of spacetime.
We shall defend the idea that these representations provide comple-
mentary descriptions of the same state of the field against the claim
that they embody completely incommensurable theories of the field.
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Sagredo: Do we not see here another example of that all-pervading
principle of complementarity which excludes the simultaneous ap-
plicability of concepts to the real objects of our world?
Is it not so that, rather than being frustrated by this limitation
of our conceptual grasp of the reality, we see in this unification of
opposites the deepest and most satisfactory result of the dialec-
tical process in our struggle for understanding?
Are Quanta Real? A Galilean Dialogue (Jauch [1973], p. 48)
1 Introduction
Philosophical reflection on quantum field theory has tended to focus on how
it revises our conception of what a particle is. For instance, though there is a
self-adjoint operator in the theory representing the total number of particles
of a field, the standard “Fock space” formalism does not individuate particles
from one another. Thus, Teller ([1995], Ch. 2) suggests that we speak of
quanta that can be “aggregated”, instead of (enumerable) particles — which
implies that they can be distinguished and labelled. Moreover, because the
theory does contain a total number of quanta observable (which, therefore,
has eigenstates corresponding to different values of this number), a field state
can be a nontrivial superposition of number eigenstates that fails to predict
any particular number of quanta with certainty. Teller ([1995], pp. 105-6)
counsels that we think of these superpositions as not actually containing any
quanta, but only propensities to display various numbers of quanta when the
field interacts with a “particle detector”.
The particle concept seems so thoroughly denuded by quantum field the-
ory that is hard to see how it could possibly underwrite the particulate nature
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of laboratory experience. Those for whom fields are the fundamental objects
of the theory are especially aware of this explanatory burden:
...quantum field theory is the quantum theory of a field, not a
theory of “particles”. However, when we consider the manner
in which a quantum field interacts with other systems to which
it is coupled, an interpretation of the states in [Fock space] in
terms of “particles” naturally arises. It is, of course, essential that
this be the case if quantum field theory is to describe observed
phenomena, since “particle-like” behaviour is commonly observed
(Wald [1994], pp. 46-7).
These remarks occur in the context of Wald’s discussion of yet another threat
to the “reality” of quanta.
The threat arises from the possibility of inequivalent representations of
the algebra of observables of a field in terms of operators on a Hilbert space.
Inequivalent representations are required in a variety of situations; for exam-
ple, interacting field theories in which the scattering matrix does not exist
(“Haag’s theorem”), free fields whose dynamics cannot be unitarily imple-
mented (Arageorgis et al [2000]), and states in quantum statistical mechan-
ics corresponding to different temperatures (Emch [1972]). The catch is that
each representation carries with it a distinct notion of “particle”. Our main
goal in this paper is to clarify the subtle relationship between inequivalent
representations of a field theory and their associated particle concepts.
Most of our discussion shall apply to any case in which inequivalent rep-
resentations of a field are available. However, we have a particular interest
in the case of the Minkowski versus Rindler representations of a free Boson
field. What makes this case intriguing is that it involves two radically differ-
ent descriptions of the particle content of the field in the very same spacetime
region. The questions we aim to answer are:
• Are the Minkowski and Rindler descriptions nevertheless, in some sense,
physically equivalent?
• Or, are they incompatible, even theoretically incommensurable?
• Can they be thought of as complementary descriptions in the same way
that the concepts of position and momentum are?
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• Or, can at most one description, the “inertial” story in terms Minkowski
quanta, be the correct one?
Few discussions of Minkowski versus Rindler quanta broaching these ques-
tions can be found in the philosophical literature, and what discussion there
is has not been sufficiently grounded in a rigorous mathematical treatment
to deliver cogent answers (as we shall see). We do not intend to survey
the vast physics literature about Minkowski versus Rindler quanta, nor all
physical aspects of the problem. Yet a proper appreciation of what is at
stake, and which answers to the above questions are sustainable, requires
that we lay out the basics of the relevant formalism. We have strived for a
self-contained treatment, in the hopes of opening up the discussion to philoso-
phers of physics already familiar with elementary non-relativistic quantum
theory. (We are inclined to agree with Torretti’s recent diagnosis that most
philosophers of physics tend to neglect quantum field theory because they
are “sickened by untidy math” ([1999], p. 397).)
We begin in section 2 with a general introduction to the problem of
quantizing a classical field theory. This is followed by a detailed discussion of
the conceptual relationship between inequivalent representations in which we
reach conclusions at variance with some of the extant literature. In section 3,
we explain how the state of motion of an observer is taken into account when
constructing a Fock space representation of a field, and how the Minkowski
and Rindler constructions give rise to inequivalent representations. Finally,
in section 4, we examine the subtle relationship between the different particle
concepts implied by these representations. In particular, we defend the idea
that they supply complementary descriptions of the same field against the
claim that they embody different, incommensurable theories.
A certain number of mathematical results play an important role in our
exposition and in our philosophical arguments. The results are stated in the
main text as propositions, and the proofs of those that cannot be found in
the literature are included in an appendix.
2 Inequivalent Field Quantizations
In section 2.1 we discuss the Weyl algebra, which in the case of infinitely
many degrees of freedom circumscribes the basic kinematical structure of
a free Boson field. After introducing in section 2.2 some important con-
cepts concerning representations of the Weyl algebra in terms of operators
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on Hilbert space, we shall be in a position to draw firm conclusions about
the conceptual relation between inequivalent representations in section 2.3.
2.1 The Weyl Algebra
Consider how one constructs the quantum-mechanical analogue of a classi-
cal system with a finite number of degrees of freedom, described by a 2n-
dimensional phase space S. Each point of S is determined by a pair of
vectors ~a,~b ∈ Rn whose components {aj} and {bj} encode all the position
and momentum components of the system
x(~a) =
n∑
j=1
ajxj , p(~b) =
n∑
j=1
bjpj. (1)
To quantize the system, we impose the canonical commutation relations
(CCRs)
[x(~a), x(~a′)] = [p(~b), p(~b′)] = 0, [x(~a), p(~b)] = i(~a ·~b)I, (2)
and, then, seek a representation of these relations in terms of operators on a
Hilbert space H. In the standard Schro¨dinger representation, H is the space
of square-integrable wavefunctions L2(Rn), x(~a) becomes the operator that
multiplies a wavefunction Ψ(x1, . . . , xn) by
∑n
j=1 ajxj , and p(
~b) is the partial
differential operator −i∑nj=1 bj ∂∂xj .
Note the action of x(~a) is not defined on an element Ψ ∈ L2(Rn) unless
x(~a)Ψ is again square-integrable, and p(~b) is not defined on Ψ unless it is suit-
ably differentiable. This is not simply a peculiarity of the Schro¨dinger repre-
sentation. Regardless of the Hilbert space on which they act, two self-adjoint
operators whose commutator is a nonzero scalar multiple of the identity, as
in (2), cannot both be everywhere defined (Kadison & Ringrose (henceforth,
KR) [1997], Remark 3.2.9). To avoid the technical inconvenience of dealing
with domains of definition, it is standard to reformulate the representation
problem in terms of unitary operators which are bounded.
Introducing the two n-parameter families of unitary operators
U(~a) := eix(~a), V (~b) := eip(
~b), ~a,~b ∈ Rn, (3)
it can be shown, at least formally, that the CCRs are equivalent to
U(~a)U(~a′) = U(~a + ~a′), V (~b)V (~b′) = V (~b+~b′), (4)
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U(~a)V (~b) = ei(~a·
~b)V (~b)U(~a), (5)
called the Weyl form of the CCRs. This equivalence holds rigorously in the
Schro¨dinger representation, however there are “irregular” representations in
which it fails (see Segal [1967], Sec. 1; Summers [1998], Sec. 1). Thus,
one reconstrues the goal as that of finding a representation of the Weyl
form of the CCRs in terms of two concrete families of unitary operators
{U(~a), V (~b) : ~a,~b ∈ Rn} acting on a Hilbert space H that can be related,
via (3), to canonical position and momentum operators on H satisfying the
CCRs. We shall return to this latter “regularity” requirement later in this
section.
Though the position and momentum degrees of freedom have so far been
treated on a different footing, we can simplify things further by introducing
the composite Weyl operators
W (~a,~b) := ei(~a·
~b)/2V (~b)U(~a), ~a,~b ∈ R. (6)
Combining this definition with Eqns. (4) and (5) yields the multiplication
rule
W (~a,~b)W (~a′,~b′) = e−iσ((~a,
~b),(~a′,~b′))/2W (~a+ ~a′,~b+~b′), (7)
where
σ((~a,~b), (~a′,~b′)) := (~a′ ·~b)− (~a ·~b′). (8)
Observe that σ(·, ·) is an anti-symmetric, bilinear form on S, called a sym-
plectic form. (Note, also, that σ is nondegenerate; i.e., if for any f ∈ S,
σ(f, g) = 0 for all g ∈ S, then f = 0.) We set
W (~a,~b)∗ := e−i(~a·
~b)/2U(−~a)V (−~b) = W (−~a,−~b). (9)
Clearly, then, any representation of the Weyl operators W (~a,~b) on a Hilbert
space H gives rise to a representation of the Weyl form of the CCRs, and
vice-versa.
Now, more generally, we allow our classical phase space S to be any
infinite-dimensional vector space, possibly constructed out of solutions to
some relativistic wave equation. We assume S comes equipped with a (non-
degenerate) symplectic form σ, and we say that a family {Wπ(f) : f ∈ S} of
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unitary operators acting on some Hilbert spaceHπ satisfies the Weyl relations
just in case (cf. (7), (9))
Wπ(f)Wπ(g) = e
−iσ(f,g)/2Wπ(f + g), f, g ∈ S, (10)
Wπ(f)
∗ = Wπ(−f), f ∈ S. (11)
We may go on to form arbitrary linear combinations of the Weyl operators,
and thus obtain (at least some of) the self-adjoint operators that will serve
as observables of the system.
Let F be a family of bounded operators on Hπ. We say that a bounded
operator A on Hπ may be uniformly approximated by operators in F just in
case for every ǫ > 0, there is an operator A˜ ∈ F such that
‖(A− A˜)x‖ < ǫ, for all unit vectors x ∈ Hπ. (12)
LetWπ denote the set of all bounded operators on Hπ that can be uniformly
approximated by elements in F , where F is the set of linear combinations of
Weyl operators Wπ(f) acting on Hπ. Wπ is called the C∗-algebra generated
by the Weyl operators {Wπ(f)}. In particular, Wπ is a subalgebra of the
algebra B(Hπ) of all bounded operators on Hπ that is itself uniformly closed
and closed under taking adjoints A 7→ A∗.
Suppose, now, that {Wπ(f)} and {Wφ(f)} are systems of Weyl opera-
tors acting, respectively, on Hilbert spaces Hπ,Hφ. Let Wπ,Wφ denote the
corresponding C∗-algebras. A bijective mapping α : Wπ 7→ Wφ is called a
∗-isomorphism just in case α is linear, multiplicative, and commutes with the
adjoint operation. We then have the following uniqueness result for the C∗-
algebra generated by Weyl operators (see Bratteli & Robinson (henceforth,
BR) [1996], Thm. 5.2.8).
Proposition 1. There is a ∗-isomorphism α from Wπ onto Wφ such that
α(Wπ(f)) =Wφ(f) for all f ∈ S.
This establishes that the C∗-algebra generated in any representation by Weyl
operators satisfying theWeyl relations is, in fact, representation-independent.
We shall denote this abstract algebra, called the Weyl algebra over (S, σ), by
W[S, σ] (and, when no confusion can result, simply say “Weyl algebra” and
writeW forW[S, σ]). So our problem boils down to choosing a representation
(π,Hπ) of the Weyl algebra, given by a mapping π : W[S, σ] 7→ B(Hπ)
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preserving all algebraic relations. Note, also, that since the image π(W) will
always be an isomorphic copy of W, π will always be one-to-one, and hence
provide a faithful representation of W.
With the representation-independent character of the Weyl algebra W,
why should we care any longer to choose a representation? After all, there is
no technical obstacle to proceeding abstractly. We can take the self-adjoint
elements of W to be the quantum-mechanical observables of our system. A
linear functional ω on W is called a state just in case ω is positive (i.e.,
ω(A∗A) ≥ 0) and normalized (i.e., ω(I) = 1). As usual, a state ω is taken
to be pure (and mixed otherwise) just in case it is not a nontrivial convex
combination of other states of W. The dynamics of the system can be rep-
resented by a one-parameter group αt of automorphisms of W (i.e., each αt
is just a map of W onto itself that preserves all algebraic relations). Hence,
if we have some initial state ω0, the final state will be given by ωt = ω0 ◦ αt.
We can even supply definitions for the probability in the state ωt that a
self-adjoint element A ∈ W takes a value lying in some Borel subset of its
spectrum (Wald [1994], pp. 79-80), and for transition probabilities between,
and superpositions of, pure states of W (Roberts & Roepstorff [1969]). At
no stage, it seems, need we ever introduce a Hilbert space as an essential
element of the formalism. In fact, Haag and Kastler ([1964], p. 852) and
Robinson ([1966], p. 488) maintain that the choice of a representation is
largely a matter of analytical convenience without physical implications.
Nonetheless, the abstract Weyl algebra does not contain unbounded op-
erators, many of which are naturally taken as corresponding to important
physical quantities. For instance, the total energy of the system, the canoni-
cally conjugate position and momentum observables — which in field theory
play the role of the local field observables — and the total number of par-
ticles. Also, we shall see later that not even any bounded function of the
total number of particles (apart from zero and the identity) lies in the Weyl
algebra. Surprisingly, Irving Segal (founder of the mathematically rigorous
approach to quantum field theory) has written that this:
. . . has the simple if quite rough and somewhat oversimplified
interpretation that the total number of “bare” particles is devoid
of physical meaning (Segal [1963], p. 56; see also his [1959], p.
12).
We shall return to this issue of physical meaning shortly. First, let us see how
a representation can be used to expand the observables of a system beyond
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the abstract Weyl algebra.
Let F be a family of bounded operators acting on a representation space
Hπ. We say that a bounded operator A on Hπ can be weakly approximated
by elements of F just in case for any vector x ∈ H, and any ǫ > 0, there is
some A˜ ∈ F such that ∣∣∣〈x,Ax〉 − 〈x, A˜x〉∣∣∣ < ǫ. (13)
(Note the important quantifier change between the definitions of uniform
and weak approximation, and that weak approximation has no abstract
representation-independent counterpart.) Consider the family π(W)− of
bounded operators that can be weakly approximated by elements of π(W),
i.e., π(W)− is the weak closure of π(W). By von Neumann’s double com-
mutant theorem, π(W)− = π(W)′′, where the prime operation on a family
of operators (here applied twice) denotes the set of all bounded operators
on Hπ commuting with that family. π(W)′′ is called the von Neumann al-
gebra generated by π(W). Clearly π(W) ⊆ π(W)′′, however we can hardly
expect that π(W) = π(W)′′ when Hπ is infinite-dimensional (which it must
be, since there is no finite-dimensional representation of the Weyl algebra
for even a single degree of freedom). Nor should we generally expect that
π(W)′′ = B(Hπ), though this does hold in “irreducible” representations, as
we explain in the next subsection.
We may now expand our observables to include all self-adjoint operators
in π(W)′′. And, although π(W)′′ still contains only bounded operators, it is
easy to associate (potentially physically significant) unbounded observables
with this algebra as well. We say that a (possibly unbounded) self-adjoint
operator A on Hπ is affiliated with π(W)′′ just in case all A’s spectral pro-
jections lie in π(W)′′. Of course, we could have adopted the same definition
for self-adjoint operators “affiliated to” π(W) itself, but C∗-algebras do not
generally contain nontrivial projections (or, if they do, will not generally
contain even the spectral projections of their self-adjoint members).
As an example, suppose we now demand to have a (so-called) regular
representation π, in which the mappings t ∈ R 7→ π(W (tf)), for all f ∈ S,
are all weakly continuous. Then Stone’s theorem will guarantee the exis-
tence of unbounded self-adjoint operators {Φ(f) : f ∈ S} on Hπ satisfying
π(W (tf)) = eiΦ(f)t, and it can be shown that all these operators are affiliated
to π(W)′′ (KR [1997], Ex. 5.7.53(ii)). In this way, we can recover as observ-
ables our original canonically conjugate positions and momenta (cf. Eqn.
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(3)), which the Weyl relations ensure will satisfy the original unbounded
form of the CCRs.
It is important to recognize, however, that by enlarging the set of observ-
ables to include those affiliated to π(W)′′, we have now left ourselves open
to arbitrariness. In contrast to Proposition 1, we now have
Proposition 2. There are (even regular) representations π, φ of W[S, σ]
for which there is no ∗-isomorphism α from π(W)′′ onto φ(W)′′ such that
α(π(W (f))) = φ(W (f)) for all f ∈ S.
This occurs when the representations are “disjoint”, which we discuss in the
next subsection.
Proposition 2 is what motivates Segal to argue that observables affiliated
to the weak closure π(W)′′ in a representation of the Weyl algebra are “some-
what unphysical” and “have only analytical significance” ([1963], pp. 11–14,
134).1 Segal is explicit that by “physical” he means “empirically measurable
in principle” ([1963], p. 11). We should not be confused by the fact that
he often calls observables that fail this test “conceptual” (suggesting they
are more than mere analytical crutches). For in Baez et al ([1992], p. 145),
Segal gives as an example the bounded self-adjoint operator cos p+(1+x2)−1
on L2(R) “for which no known ‘Gedanken experiment’ will actually directly
determine the spectrum, and so [it] represents an observable in a purely con-
ceptual sense”. Thus, the most obvious reading of Segal’s position is that
he subscribes to an operationalist view about the physical significance of
theoretical quantities. Indeed, since good reasons can be given for the im-
possibility of exact (“sharp”) measurements of all the observables in a von
Neumann algebra generated by a C∗-algebra (see Wald [1994], Halvorson
[2000a]), operationalism explains Segal’s dismissal of the physical (as op-
posed to analytical) significance of observables not in the Weyl algebra per
se. (Also, it is worth recalling that Bridgman himself was similarly unphased
by having to relegate much of the mathematical structure of a physical theory
to “a ghostly domain with no physical relevance” ([1936], p. 116).)
Of course, insofar as operationalism is philosophically defensible at all, it
does not compell assent. And, in this instance, Segal’s operationalism has
1Actually, Segal consistently finds it convenient to work with a strictly larger algebra
than our (minimal) Weyl algebra, sometimes called the mode finite or tame Weyl algebra.
However, both Proposition 1 (see Baez et al [1992], Thm. 5.1) and Proposition 2 continue
to hold for the tame Weyl algebra (also cf. Segal [1967], pp. 128-9).
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not dissuaded others from taking the more liberal view apparently advocated
by Wald:
. . . one should not view [the Weyl algebra] as encompassing all
observables of the theory; rather, one should view [it] as encom-
passing a “minimal” collection of observables, which is sufficiently
large to enable the theory to be formulated. One may later wish to
enlarge [the algebra] and/or further restrict the notion of “state”
in order to accommodate the existence of additional observables
([1994], p. 75).
The conservative and liberal views entail quite different commitments about
the physical equivalence of representations — or so we shall argue.
2.2 Equivalence and Disjointness of Representations
It is essential that precise mathematical definitions of equivalence be clearly
distinguished from the, often dubious, arguments that have been offered for
their conceptual significance. We confine this section to discussing the defi-
nitions.
Since our ultimate goal is to discuss the Minkowski and Rindler quan-
tizations of the Weyl algebra, we only need to consider the case where one
of the two representations at issue, say π, is “irreducible” and the other, φ,
is “factorial”. A representation π of W is called irreducible just in case no
non-trivial subspace of the Hilbert space Hπ is invariant under the action
of all operators in π(W). It is not difficult to see that this is equivalent to
π(W)′′ = B(Hπ) (using the fact that an invariant subspace will exist just in
case the projection onto it commutes with all of π(W)). A representation φ
of W is called factorial whenever the von Neumann algebra φ(W)′′ is a fac-
tor, i.e., it has trivial centre (the only operators in φ(W)′′ that commute with
all other operators in that set are multiples of the identity). Since B(Hπ)
is a factor, it is clear that π’s irreducibility entails its factoriality. Thus,
the Schro¨dinger representation of the Weyl algebra is both irreducible and
factorial.
The strongest form of equivalence between representations is unitary
equivalence: φ and π are said to be unitarily equivalent just in case there is
a unitary operator U mapping Hφ isometrically onto Hπ, and such that
Uφ(A)U−1 = π(A) ∀A ∈ W. (14)
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There are two other weaker definitions of equivalence.
Given a family πi of irreducible representations of the Weyl algebra on
Hilbert spaces Hi, we can construct another (reducible) representation φ of
the Weyl algebra on the direct sum Hilbert space
∑⊕Hi, by setting
φ(A) =
∑
i
⊕ πi(A), A ∈ W. (15)
If each representation (πi,Hi) is unitarily equivalent to some representation
(π,H), we say that φ = ∑⊕πi is a multiple of the representation π. Fur-
thermore, we say that two representations of the Weyl algebra, φ (factorial)
and π (irreducible), are quasi-equivalent just in case φ is a multiple of π. It
should be obvious from this characterization that quasi-equivalence weakens
unitary equivalence.
Another way to see this is to use the fact (KR [1997], Def. 10.3.1, Cor.
10.3.4) that quasi-equivalence of φ and π is equivalent to the existence of
a ∗-isomorphism α from φ(W)′′ onto π(W)′′ such that α(φ(A)) = π(A) for
all A ∈ W. Unitary equivalence is then just the special case where the
∗-isomorphism α can be implemented by a unitary operator.
If φ is not even quasi-equivalent to π, then we say that φ and π are disjoint
representations ofW.2 Note, then, that if both π and φ are irreducible, they
are either unitarily equivalent or disjoint.
We can now state the following pivotal result (von Neumann [1931]).
Stone-von Neumann Uniqueness Theorem. When S is finite-dimensional,
every regular representation of the Weyl algebra W[S, σ] is quasi-equivalent
to the Schro¨dinger representation.
This theorem is usually interpreted as saying that there is a unique quantum
theory corresponding to a classical theory with finitely-many degrees of free-
dom. The theorem fails in field theory — where S is infinite-dimensional —
opening the door to disjoint representations and Proposition 2.
2In general, disjointness is not defined as the negation of quasi-equivalence, but by
the more cumbersome formulation: Two representations π, φ are disjoint just in case π
has no “subrepresentation” quasi-equivalent to φ, and φ has no subrepresentation quasi-
equivalent to π. Since we are only interested, however, in the special case where π is
irreducible (and hence has no non-trivial subrepresentations) and φ is “factorial” (and
hence is quasi-equivalent to each of its subrepresentations), the cumbersome formulation
reduces to our definition.
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There is another way to think of the relations between representations, in
terms of states. Recall the abstract definition of a state of a C∗-algebra, as
simply a positived normalized linear functional on the algebra. Since, in any
representation π, π(W) is just a faithful copy of W, π induces a one-to-one
correspondence between the abstract states of W and the abstract states of
π(W). Note now that some of the abstract states on π(W) are the garden-
variety density operator states that we are familiar with from elementary
quantum mechanics. In particular, define ωD on π(W) by setting
ωD(A) := Tr(DA), A ∈ π(W). (16)
In general, however, there will be abstract states of π(W) that are not given
by density operators via Eqn. (16).3 We say then that an abstract state ω
of π(W) is normal just in case it is given (via Eqn. (16)) by some density
operator D on Hπ. We let F(π) denote the subset of the abstract state
space ofW consisting of those states that correspond to normal states in the
representation π, and we call F(π) the folium of the representation π. That
is, ω ∈ F(π) just in case there is a density operator D on Hπ such that
ω(A) = Tr(Dπ(A)), A ∈ W. (17)
We then have the following equivalences (KR [1997], Prop. 10.3.13):
π and φ are quasi-equivalent ⇐⇒ F(π) = F(φ),
π and φ are disjoint ⇐⇒ F(π) ∩ F(φ) = ∅.
In other words, π and φ are quasi-equivalent just in case they share the same
normal states. And π and φ are disjoint just in case they have no normal
states in common.
In fact, if π is disjoint from φ, then all normal states in the representation
π are “orthogonal” to all normal states in the representation φ. We may think
of this situation intuitively as follows. Define a third representation ψ of W
on Hπ ⊕Hφ by setting
ψ(A) = π(A)⊕ φ(A), A ∈ W. (18)
3 Gleason’s theorem does not rule out these states because it is not part of the definition
of an abstract state that it be countably additive over mutually orthogonal projections.
Indeed, such additivity does not even make sense abstractly, because an infinite sum of
orthogonal projections can never converge uniformly, only weakly (in a representation).
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Then, every normal state of the representation π is orthogonal to every nor-
mal state of the representation φ.4 This makes sense of the oft-repeated
phrase (see, e.g., Gerlach [1989]) that “The Rindler vacuum is orthogonal to
all states in the Minkowski vacuum representation”.
While not every abstract state of W will be in the folium of a given
representation, there is always some representation of W in which the state
is normal, as a consequence of the following (see KR [1997], Thms. 4.5.2 and
10.2.3).
Gelfand-Naimark-Segal Theorem. Any abstract state ω of a C∗-algebra
A gives rise to a unique (up to unitary equivalence) representation (πω,Hω)
of A and vector Ωω ∈ Hω such that
ω(A) = 〈Ωω, πω(A)Ωω〉, A ∈ A, (19)
and such that the set {πω(A)Ωω : A ∈ A} is dense in Hω. Moreover, πω is
irreducible just in case ω is pure.
The triple (πω,Hω,Ωω) is called the GNS representation of A induced by the
state ω, and Ωω is called a cyclic vector for the representation. We shall see
in the next main section how the Minkowski and Rindler vacuums induce
disjoint GNS representations of the Weyl algebra.
There is a third notion of equivalence of representations, still weaker than
quasi-equivalence. Let π be a representation ofW, and let F(π) be the folium
of π. We say that an abstract state ω of W can be weak* approximated by
states in F(π) just in case for each ǫ > 0, and for each finite collection
{Ai : i = 1, . . . , n} of operators in W, there is a state ω′ ∈ F(π) such that
|ω(Ai)− ω′(Ai)| < ǫ, i ∈ [1, n]. (20)
Two representations π, φ are then said to be weakly equivalent just in case all
states in F(π) may be weak* approximated by states in F(φ) and vice-versa.
We then have the following fundamental result (Fell [1960]).
Fell’s Theorem. Let π be a faithful representation of a C∗-algebra A. Then,
every abstract state of A may be weak* approximated by states in F(π).
4This intuitive picture may be justified by making use of the “universal representation”
of W (KR [1997], Thm. 10.3.5).
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In particular, then, it follows that all representations ofW are weakly equiv-
alent.
In summary, we have the following implications for any two representa-
tions π, φ:
Unitarily equivalent =⇒ Quasi-equivalent =⇒ Weakly equivalent.
If π and φ are both irreducible, then the first arrow is reversible.
2.3 Physical Equivalence of Representations
Do disjoint representations yield physically inequivalent theories? It depends
on what one takes to be the physical content of a theory, and what one means
by “equivalent theories” — subjects about which philosophers of science have
had plenty to say.
Recall that Reichenbach [1938] deemed two theories “the same” just in
case they are empirically equivalent, i.e., they are confirmed equally under all
possible evidence. Obviously this criterion, were we to adopt it here, would
beg the question against those who (while agreeing that, strictly speaking,
only self-adjoint elements of the Weyl algebra can actually be measured)
invest physical importance to “global” quantities only definable in a repre-
sentation, like the total number of particles.
A stronger notion of equivalence, due originally to Glymour [1971] (who
proposed it only as a necessary condition), is that two theories are equiva-
lent only if they are “intertranslatable”. This is often cashed out in logical
terms as the possibility of defining the primitives of one theory in terms of
those of the other so that the theorems of the first appear as logical conse-
quences of those of the second, and vice-versa. Prima facie, this criterion
is ill-suited to the present context, because the different “theories” are not
presented to us as syntactic structures or formalized logical systems, but
rather two competing algebras of observables whose states represent physical
predictions. In addition, intertranslatability per se has nothing to say about
what portions of the mathematical formalism of the two physical theories be-
ing compared ought to be intertranslatable, and what should be regarded as
“surplus mathematical structure” not required to be part of the translation.
Nevertheless, we believe the intertranslatability thesis can be naturally
expressed in the present context and rendered neutral as between the con-
servative and liberal approaches to physical observables discussed earlier.
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Think of the Weyl operators {φ(W (f)) : f ∈ S} and {π(W (f)) : f ∈ S}
as the primitives of our two “theories”, in analogy with the way the natural
numbers can be regarded as the primitives of a “theory” of real numbers.
Just as we may define rational numbers as ratios of natural numbers, and
then construct real numbers as the limits of Cauchy sequences of rationals,
we construct the Weyl algebras φ(W) and π(W) by taking linear combina-
tions of the Weyl operators and then closing in the uniform topology. We
then close in the weak topology of the two representations to obtain the
von Neumann algebras φ(W)′′ and π(W)′′. Whether the observables affili-
ated with this second closure have physical significance is up for grabs, as is
whether we should be conservative and take only normal states in the given
representation to be physical, or be more liberal and admit a broader class
of algebraic states. The analogue of the “theorems” of the theory are then
statements about the expectation values dictated by the physical states for
the self-adjoint elements in the physically relevant algebra of the theory.
We therefore propose the following formal rendering of Glymour’s inter-
translatability thesis adapted to the present context. Representations φ and
π are physically equivalent only if there exists a bijective mapping α from
the physical observables of the representation φ to the physical observables
of the representation π, and another bijective mapping β from the physical
states of the representation φ to the physical states of the representation π,
such that
α(φ(W (f))) = π(W (f)), ∀f ∈ S, (21)
(“primitives”)
β(ω)(α(A)) = ω(A), ∀ states ω, ∀ observables A. (22)
(“theorems”)
Of course, the notion of equivalence we obtain depends on how we construe
the phrases “physical observables of a representation π” and “physical states
of a representation π”. According to a conservative rendering of observables,
only the self-adjoint elements of the Weyl algebra π(W) are genuine physical
observables of the representation π. (More generally, an unbounded operator
on Hπ is a physical observable only if all of its bounded functions lie in
π(W).) On the other hand, a liberal rendering of observables considers all
self-adjoint operators in the weak closure π(W)− of π(W) as genuine physical
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observables. (More generally, those unbounded operators whose bounded
functions lie in π(W)− should be considered genuine physical observables.)
A conservative with respect to states claims that only those density operator
states (i.e., normal states) of the algebra π(W) are genuine physical states.
On the other hand, a liberal with respect to states claims that all algebraic
states of π(W) should be thought of as genuine physical states. We thereby
obtain four distinct necessary conditions for physical equivalence, according
to whether one is conservative or liberal about observables, and conservative
or liberal about states.
Arageorgis ([1995], p. 302) and Arageorgis et al ([2000], p. 3) also take
the correct notion of physical equivalence in this context to be intertrans-
latability. On the basis of informal discussions (with rather less supporting
argument than one would have liked), they claim that physical equivalence
of representations requires that they be unitarily equivalent. (They do not
discuss quasi-equivalence.) We disagree with this conclusion, but there is
still substantial overlap between us. For instance, with our precise necessary
condition for physical equivalence above, we can now establish the following
elementary result.
Proposition 3. Under the conservative approach to states, φ (factorial) and
π (irreducible) are physically equivalent representations of W only if they are
quasi-equivalent.
Proof. Let ω be a normal state of φ(W). Then, by hypothesis, β(ω) is a
normal state of π(W). Define a state ρ on W by
ρ(A) = ω(φ(A)), A ∈ W. (23)
Since ω is normal, ρ ∈ F(φ). Define a state ρ′ on W by
ρ′(A) = β(ω)(π(A)), A ∈ W. (24)
Since β(ω) is normal, ρ′ ∈ F(π). Now, conditions (21) and (22) entail that
ω(φ(A)) = β(ω)(α(φ(A))) = β(ω)(π(A)), (25)
for any A = W (f) ∈ W, and thus ρ(W (f)) = ρ′(W (f)) for any f ∈ S.
However, a state of the Weyl algebra is uniquely determined (via linearity
and uniform continuity) by its action on the generators {W (f) : f ∈ S}.
Thus, ρ = ρ′ and since ρ ∈ F(φ) ∩ F(π), it follows that φ and π are quasi-
equivalent.
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With somewhat more work, the following result may also be established.5
Proposition 4. Under the liberal approach to observables, φ (factorial) and
π (irreducible) are physically equivalent representations of W only if they are
quasi-equivalent.
The above results leave only the position of the “conservative about ob-
servables/liberal about states” undecided. However, we claim, pace Arageor-
gis et al, that a proponent of this position can satisfy conditions (21),(22)
without committing himself to quasi-equivalence of the representations. Since
he is conservative about observables, Proposition 1 already guarantees the
existence of a bijective mapping α— in fact, a *-isomorphism from the whole
of φ(W) to the whole of π(W) — satisfying (21). And if he is liberal about
states, the state mapping β need not map any normal state of φ(W) into a
normal state of π(W), bypassing the argument for Proposition 3. Consider,
for example, the liberal who takes all algebraic states of φ(W) and π(W) to
be physically significant. Then for any algebraic state ω of φ(W), the bijec-
tive mapping β that sends ω to the state ω ◦ α−1 on π(W) trivially satisfies
condition (22) even when φ and π are disjoint.
Though we have argued that Segal was conservative about observables,
we are not claiming he was a liberal about states. In fact, Segal consistently
maintained that only the “regular states” of the Weyl algebra have phys-
ical relevance ([1961], p. 7; [1967], pp. 120, 132). A state ω of W[S, σ]
is called regular just in case the map f 7→ ω(W (f)) is continuous on all
finite-dimensional subspaces of S; or, equivalently, just in case the GNS rep-
resentation of W[S, σ] determined by ω is regular (Segal [1967], p. 134).
However, note that, unlike normality of a state, regularity is representation-
independent. Taking the set of all regular states of the Weyl algebra to be
physical is therefore still liberal enough to permit satisfaction of condition
(22). For the mapping β of the previous paragraph trivially preserves regu-
larity, insofar as both ω and ω ◦ α−1 induce the same abstract regular state
of W.
Our verdict, then, is that Segal is not committed to saying only quasi-
equivalent representations can be physically equivalent. And this explains
why he sees fit to define physical equivalence of representations in such a
way that Proposition 1 secures the physical equivalence of all representa-
tions (see Segal [1961], Defn. 1(c)). (Indeed, Segal regards Proposition 1 as
5Our proof in the appendix makes rigorous Arageorgis’ brief (and insufficient) reference
to Wigner’s symmetry representation theorem in his ([1995], p. 302, footnote).
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the appropriate generalization of the Stone-von Neumann uniqueness theo-
rem to infinite-dimensional S.) One might still ask what the point of passing
to a concrete Hilbert space representation of W is if one is going to allow as
physically possible regular states not in the folium of the chosen representa-
tion. The point, we take it, is that if we are interested in drawing out the
predictions of some particular regular state, such as the Minkowski vacuum
or the Rindler vacuum, then passing to a particular representation will put at
our disposal all the standard analytical techniques of Hilbert space quantum
mechanics to facilitate calculations in that particular state.6
Haag & Kastler ([1964], p. 852) and Robinson ([1966], p. 488) have
argued that by itself the weak equivalence of all representations of the Weyl
algebra entails their physical equivalence.7 Their argument starts from the
fact that, by measuring the expectations of a finite number of observables
{Ai} in the Weyl algebra, each to a finite degree of accuracy ǫ, we can only
determine the state of the system to within a weak* neighborhood. But by
Fell’s density theorem, states from the folium of every representation lie in
this neighborhood. So for all practical purposes, we can never determine
which representation is the physically “correct” one and they all, in some
(as yet, unarticulated!) sense, carry the same physical content. And as a
corollary, choosing a representation is simply a matter of convention.
Clearly the necessary condition for physical equivalence we have proposed
constitutes a very different notion of equivalence than weak equivalence, so
we are not disposed to agree with this argument. Evidently it presupposes
that only the observables in the Weyl algebra itself are physically significant,
which we have granted could be grounded in operationalism. However, there
is an additional layer of operationalism that the argument must presuppose:
scepticism about the physical meaning of postulating an absolutely precise
state for the system. If we follow this scepticism to its logical conclusion,
we should instead think of physical states of the Weyl algebra as represented
6In support of not limiting the physical states of the Weyl algebra to any one repre-
sentation’s folium, one can also cite the cases of non-unitarily implementable dynamics
discussed by Arageorgis et al ([2000]) in which dynamical evolution occurs between regular
states that induce disjoint GNS representations. In such cases, it would hardly be coherent
to maintain that regular states dynamically accessible to one another are not physically
co-possible.
7Indeed, the term “physical equivalence” is often used synonomously with weak equiv-
alence; for example, by Emch ([1972], p. 108), who, however, issues the warning that “we
should be seriously wary of semantic extrapolations” from this usage. Indeed!
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by weak* neighborhoods of algebraic states. What it would then mean to
falsify a state, so understood, is that some finite number of expectation values
measured to within finite accuracy are found to be incompatible with all the
algebraic states in some proposed weak* neighborhood. Unfortunately, no
particular “state” in this sense can ever be fully empirically adequate, for
any hypothesized state (= weak* neighborhood) will be subject to constant
revision as the accuracy and number of our experiments increase. We agree
with Summers [1998] that this would do irreparable damage to the predictive
power of the theory — damage that can only be avoided by maintaining that
there is a correct algebraic state.
We do not, however, agree with Summers’ presumption (tacitly endorsed
by Arageorgis et al [2000]) that we not only need the correct algebraic state,
but “ . . . the correct state in the correct representation” ([2000], p. 13;
italics ours). This added remark of Summers’ is directed against the conven-
tionalist corollary to Fell’s theorem. Yet we see nothing in the point about
predictive power that privileges any particular representation, not even the
GNS representation of the predicted state. We might well have good rea-
son to deliberately choose a representation in which the precise algebraic
state predicted is not normal. (For example, Kay [1985] does exactly this,
by “constructing” the Minkowski vacuum as a thermal state in the Rindler
quantization.) The role Fell’s theorem plays is then, at best, methodolog-
ical. All it guarantees is that when we calculate with density operators in
our chosen represention, we can always get a reasonably good indication of
the predictions of whatever precise algebraic state we have postulated for the
system.
So much for the conservative stance on observables. An interpreter of
quantum field theory is not likely to find it attractive, if only because none
of the observables that have any chance of underwriting the particle concept
lie in the Weyl algebra. But suppose, as interpreters, we adopt the liberal
approach to observables. Does the physical inequivalence of disjoint repre-
sentations entail their incompatibility, or even incommensurability? By this,
we do not mean to conjure up Kuhnian thoughts about incommensurable
“paradigms”, whose proponents share no methods to resolve their disputes.
Rather, we are pointing to the (more Feyerabendian?) possibility of an unan-
alyzable shift in meaning between disjoint representations as a consequence
the fact that the concepts (observables and/or states) of one representation
are not wholly definable or translatable in terms of those of the other.
One might think of neutralizing this threat by viewing disjoint representa-
20
tions as sub-theories or models of a more general theory built upon the Weyl
algebra. Consider the analogy of two different classical systems, modelled,
say, by phase spaces of different dimension. Though not physically equiv-
alent, these models hardly define incommensurable theories insofar as they
share the characteristic kinematical and dynamical features that warrant the
term “classical”. Surely the same could be said of disjoint representations of
the Weyl algebra?
Alas, there is a crucial disanalogy. In the case of the Minkowski and
Rindler representations, physicists freely switch between them to describe
the quantum state of the very same “system” — in this case, the quantum
field in a fixed region of spacetime (see, e.g., Unruh and Wald [1984] and
Wald [1994], Sec. 5.1). And, as we shall see later, the weak closures of
these representations provide physically inequivalent descriptions of the par-
ticle content in the region. So it is tempting to view this switching back and
forth between disjoint representations as conceptually incoherent (Arageorgis
[1995], p. 268), and to see the particle concepts associated to the represen-
tations as not just different, but outright incommensurable (Arageorgis et al
[2000]).
We shall argue that this view, tempting as it is, goes too far. For suppose
we do take the view that the observables affiliated to the von Neumann
algebras generated by two disjoint representations φ and π simply represent
different physical aspects of the same physical system. If we are also liberal
about states (not restricting ourselves to any one representation’s folium),
then it is natural to ask what implications a state ω of our system, that
happens to be in the folium of φ, has for the observables in π(W)′′. In many
cases, it is possible to extract a definite answer.
In particular, any abstract state ω of W gives rise to a state on π(W),
which may be extended to a state on the weak closure π(W)′′ (KR [1997],
Thm. 4.3.13). The only catch is that unless ω ∈ F(π), this extension will
not be unique. For, only normal states of π(W) possess sufficiently nice
continuity properties to ensure that their values on π(W) uniquely fix their
values on the weak-closure π(W)′′ (see KR [1997], Thm. 7.1.12). However,
it may happen that all extensions of ω agree on the expectation value they
assign to a particular observable affiliated to π(W)′′. This is the strategy
we shall use to make sense of assertions such as “The Minkowski vacuum
in a (Rindler) spacetime wedge is full of Rindler quanta” (cf., e.g., DeWitt
[1979a]). The very fact that such assertions can be made sense of at all takes
the steam out of claims that disjoint representations are incommensurable.
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Indeed, we shall ultimately argue that this shows disjoint representations
should not be treated as competing “theories” in the first place.
3 Constructing representations
We now explain how to construct “Fock representations” of the CCRs. In
sections 3.1 and 3.2 we show how this construction depends on one’s choice
of preferred timelike motion in Minkowski spacetime. In section 3.3, we show
that alternative choices of preferred timelike motion can result in unitarily
inequivalent — indeed, disjoint — representations.
3.1 First Quantization (“Splitting the Frequencies”)
The first step in the quantization scheme consists in turning the classical
phase space (S, σ) into a quantum-mechanical “one particle space” — i.e., a
Hilbert space. The non-uniqueness of the quantization scheme comes in at
this very first step.
Depending on our choice of preferred timelike motion, we will have a
one-parameter group Tt of linear mappings from S onto S representing the
evolution of the classical system in time. The flow t 7→ Tt should also pre-
serve the symplectic form. A bijective real-linear mapping T : S 7→ S is
called a symplectomorphism just in case T preserves the symplectic form;
i.e., σ(Tf, Tg) = σ(f, g) for all f, g ∈ S.
We say that J is a complex structure for (S, σ) just in case
1. J is a symplectomorphism,
2. J2 = −I,
3. σ(f, Jf) > 0, 0 6= f ∈ S.
Relative to a complex structure J , we may extend the scalar multiplication
on S to complex numbers; viz., take multiplication by a + bi as given by
a + bi := af + bJf ∈ S. We may also define an inner product (·, ·)J on the
resulting complex vector space by setting
(f, g)J := σ(f, Jg) + iσ(f, g), f, g ∈ S. (26)
We let SJ denote the Hilbert space that results when we equip (S, σ) with
the extended scalar multiplication and inner product (·, ·)J .
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A symplectomorphism T is (by assumption) a real-linear operator on
S. However, it does not automatically follow that T is a complex -linear
operator on SJ , since T (if) = i(Tf) may fail. If, however, T commutes
with J , then T will be a complex-linear operator on SJ , and it is easy to
see that (Tf, Tg)J = (f, g)J for all f, g ∈ SJ , so T would in fact be unitary.
Accordingly, we say that a group Tt of symplectomorphisms on (S, σ) is
unitarizable relative to J just in case [J, Tt] = 0 for all t ∈ R.
If Tt is unitarizable and t 7→ Tt is weakly continuous, so that we have
Tt = e
itH (by Stone’s theorem), we say that Tt has positive energy just in
case H is a positive operator. In general, we say that (H, Ut) is a quantum
one particle system just in case H is a Hilbert space and Ut is a weakly
continuous one-parameter unitary group on H with positive energy. Kay
([1979]) proved:
Proposition 5. Let Tt be a one-parameter group of symplectomorphisms of
(S, σ). If there is a complex structure J on (S, σ) such that (SJ , Tt) is a
quantum one particle system, then J is unique.
Physically, the time translation group Tt determines a natural decomposition
(or “splitting”) of the solutions of the relativistic wave equation we are quan-
tizing into those that oscillate with purely positive and with purely negative
frequency with respect to the motion. This has the effect of uniquely fixing
a choice of J , and the Hilbert space SJ then provides a representation of the
positive frequency solutions alone.8
3.2 Second Quantization (Fock space)
Once we have a fixed complex structure J on (S, σ), the “second quantiza-
tion” procedure yields a unique representation (π,Hπ) of the Weyl algebra
W[S, σ].
Let Hn denote the n-fold symmetric tensor product of SJ with itself.
That is, using SnJ to denote SJ ⊗ · · · ⊗ SJ (n times), Hn = P+(SnJ ) where
P+ is the projection onto the symmetric subspace. Then we define a Hilbert
space
F(SJ) := C⊕H1 ⊕H2 ⊕H3 ⊕ · · · , (27)
8For more physical details, see Fulling ([1972], Secs. VIII.3,4) and Wald ([1994], pp.
41-2, 63, 111).
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called the bosonic Fock space over SJ . Let
Ω := 1⊕ 0⊕ 0⊕ · · · , (28)
denote the privileged “Fock vacuum” state in F(SJ).
Now, we define creation and annihilation operators on F(SJ) in the usual
way. For any fixed f ∈ S, we first consider the unique bounded linear
extensions of the mappings a∗n(f) : Sn−1J → SnJ and an(f) : SnJ → Sn−1J
defined by the following actions on product vectors
a∗n(f)(f1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ fn−1) = f ⊗ f1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ fn−1, (29)
an(f)(f1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ fn) = (f, f1)J f2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ fn. (30)
We then define the unbounded creation and annihilation operators on F(SJ)
by
a∗(f) := a∗1(f)⊕
√
2P+a
∗
2(f)⊕
√
3P+a
∗
3(f)⊕ · · · , (31)
a(f) := 0⊕ a1(f)⊕
√
2a2(f)⊕
√
3a3(f)⊕ · · · . (32)
(Note that the mapping f 7→ a∗(f) is linear while f 7→ a(f) is anti -linear.)
As the definitions and notation suggest, a∗(f) and a(f) are each other’s
adjoint, a∗(f) is the creation operator for a particle with wavefunction f , and
a(f) the corresponding annihilation operator. The unbounded self-adjoint
operator N(f) = a∗(f)a(f) represents the number of particles in the field
with wavefunction f (unbounded, because we are describing bosons to which
no exclusion principle applies). Summing N(f) over any J-orthonormal basis
of wavefunctions in SJ , we obtain the total number operator N on F(SJ),
which has the form
N = 0⊕ 1⊕ 2⊕ 3⊕ · · · . (33)
Next, we define the self-adjoint “field operators”
Φ(f) := 2−1/2(a∗(f) + a(f)), f ∈ S. (34)
(In heuristic discussions of free quantum field theory, these are normally en-
countered as “operator-valued solutions” Φ(x) to a relativistic field equation
24
at some fixed time. However, if we want to associate a properly defined
self-adjoint field operator with the spatial point x, we must consider a neigh-
borhood of x, and an operator of form Φ(f), where the “test-function” f ∈ S
has support in the neighborhood.9) Defining the unitary operators
π(W (tf)) := exp(itΦ(f)), t ∈ R, f ∈ S, (35)
it can then be verified (though it is not trivial) that the π(W (f)) satisfy the
Weyl form of the CCRs. In fact, the mapping W (f) 7→ π(W (f)) gives an
irreducible regular representation π of W on F(SJ).
We also have
〈Ω, π(W (f))Ω〉 = e−(f,f)J/4, f ∈ S. (36)
(We shall always distinguish the inner product of F(SJ) from that of SJ by
using angle brackets.) The vacuum vector Ω ∈ F(SJ) defines an abstract
regular state ωJ of W via ωJ(A) := 〈Ω, π(A)Ω〉 for all A ∈ W. Since the
action of π(W) on F(SJ) is irreducible, {π(A)Ω : A ∈ W} is dense in
F(SJ) (else its closure would be a non-trivial subspace invariant under all
operators in π(W)). Thus, the Fock representation ofW on F(SJ) is unitarily
equivalent to the GNS representation ofW determined by the pure state ωJ .
In sum, a complex structure J on (S, σ) gives rise to an abstract vacuum
state ωJ on W[S, σ] whose GNS representation (πωJ ,HωJ ,ΩωJ ) is just the
standard Fock vacuum representation (π,F(SJ),Ω). Note also that inverting
Eqn. (34) yields
a∗(f) = 2−1/2(Φ(f)− iΦ(if)), a(f) = 2−1/2(Φ(f) + iΦ(if)), f ∈ S. (37)
Thus, we could just as well have arrived at the Fock representation of W
“abstractly” by starting with the pure regular state ωJ on W[S, σ] as our
proposed vacuum, exploiting its regularity to guarantee the existence of field
operators {Φ(f) : f ∈ S} acting on HωJ , and then using Eqns. (37) to define
a∗(f) and a(f) (and, from thence, the number operators N(f) and N).
There is a natural way to construct operators on F(SJ) out of operators
on the one-particle space SJ , using the second quantization map Γ and its
“derivative” dΓ. Unlike the representation map π, the operators on F(SJ) in
9The picture of a quantum field as an operator-valued field — or, as Teller ([1995],
Ch. 5) aptly puts it, a field of “determinables” — unfortunately, has no mathematically
rigorous foundation.
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the range of Γ and dΓ do not “come from” W[S, σ], but rather B(SJ). Since
the latter depends on how S was complexified, we cannot expect second
quantized observables to be representation-independent.
To define dΓ, first let H be a self-adjoint (possibly unbounded) operator
on SJ . We define Hn on Hn by setting H0 = 0 and
Hn(P+(f1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ fn)) = P+
(
n∑
i=1
f1 ⊗ f2 ⊗ · · · ⊗Hfi ⊗ · · · ⊗ fn
)
, (38)
for all fi in the domain of H , and then extending by continuity. It then
follows that ⊕n≥0Hn is an “essentially selfadjoint” operator on F(SJ) (see
BR [1996], p. 8). We let
dΓ(H) :=
⊕
n≥0
Hn, (39)
denote the resulting (closed) self-adjoint operator. The simplest example
occurs when we take H = I, in which case it is easy to see that dΓ(H) = N .
In stark contrast to this, we have the following.10
Proposition 6. When S is infinite-dimensional, π(W[S, σ]) contains no
non-trivial bounded functions of the total number operator on F(SJ).
In particular, π(W) does not contain any of the spectral projections of N .
Thus, while the conservative about observables is free to refer to the abstract
state ωJ ofW as a “vacuum” state, he cannot use that language to underwrite
the claim that ωJ is a state of “no particles”!
To define Γ, let U be a unitary operator on SJ . Then Un = P+(U⊗· · ·⊗U)
is a unitary operator on Hn. We define the unitary operator Γ(U) on F(SJ)
by
Γ(U) :=
⊕
n≥0
Un. (40)
If Ut = e
itH is a weakly continuous unitary group on SJ , then Γ(Ut) is a
weakly continuous group on F(SJ), and we have
Γ(Ut) = e
itdΓ(H). (41)
10Our proof in the appendix reconstructs the argument briefly sketched in Segal ([1959],
p. 12).
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In particular, the one-particle evolution Tt = e
itH that was used to fix J
“lifts” to a field evolution given by Γ(Tt), where dΓ(H) represents the energy
of the field and has the vacuum Ω as a ground state.
It can be shown that the representation and second quantization maps
interact as follows:
π(W (Uf)) = Γ(U)∗π(W (f))Γ(U), f ∈ S, (42)
for any unitary operator U on SJ . Taking the phase transformation U = eitI,
it follows that
π(W (eitf)) = e−itNπ(W (f))eitN , f ∈ S, t ∈ R. (43)
Using Eqn. (36), it also follows that
〈Γ(U)Ω, π(W (f))Γ(U)Ω〉 = 〈Ω, π(W (Uf))Ω〉 = 〈Ω, π(W (f))Ω〉. (44)
Since the states induced by the vectors Ω and Γ(U)Ω are both normal in π
and agree on π(W), they determine the same state of π(W)′′ = B(F(SJ)).
Thus Ω must be an eigenvector of Γ(U) for any unitary operator U on SJ . In
particular, the vacuum is invariant under the group Γ(Tt), and is therefore
time-translation invariant.
3.3 Disjointness of the Minkowski and Rindler repre-
sentations
We omit the details of the construction of the classical phase space (S, σ),
since they are largely irrelevant to our concerns. The only information we
need is that the space S may be taken (roughly) to be solutions to some
relativistic wave equation, such as the Klein-Gordon equation. More partic-
ularly, S may be taken to consist of pairs of smooth, compactly supported
functions on R3: one function specifies the values of the field at each point
in space at some initial time (say t = 0), and the other function is the time-
derivative of the field (evaluated at t = 0). If we then choose a “timelike
flow” in Minkowski spacetime, we will get a corresponding flow in the solu-
tion space S; and, in particular, this flow will be given by a one-parameter
group Tt of symplectomorphisms on (S, σ).
First, consider the group Tt of symplectomorphisms of (S, σ) induced
by the standard inertial timelike flow. (See Figure 1, which suppresses two
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Figure 1: Minkowski and Rindler Motions.
spatial dimensions. Note that it is irrelevant which inertial frame’s flow
we pick, since they all determine the same representation of W[S, σ] up to
unitary equivalence; see Wald [1994], p. 106.) It is well-known that there is a
complex structure M on (S, σ) such that (SM , Tt) is a quantum one-particle
system (see Kay [1985]; Horuzhy [1988], Ch. 4). We call the associated pure
regular state ωM ofW[S, σ] the Minkowski vacuum state. As we have seen, it
gives rise via the GNS construction to a unique Fock vacuum representation
πωM on the Hilbert space HωM = F(SM).
Next, consider the group of Lorentz boosts about a given centre point
O in spacetime. This also gives rise to a one-parameter group Ts of sym-
plectomorphisms of (S, σ) (cf. Figure 1). Let S(⊳) be the subspace of S
consisting of Cauchy data with support in the right Rindler wedge (x1 > 0);
i.e., at s = 0, both the field and its first derivative vanish when x1 ≤ 0. Let
W⊳ := W[S(⊳), σ] be the Weyl algebra over the symplectic space (S(⊳), σ).
Then, Ts leaves S(⊳) invariant, and hence gives rise to a one-parameter group
of symplectomorphisms of (S(⊳), σ). Kay ([1985]) has shown rigorously that
there is indeed a complex structure R on (S(⊳), σ) such that (S(⊳)R, Ts) is
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a quantum one particle system. We call the resulting state ω⊳R of W⊳ the
(right) Rindler vacuum state. It gives rise to a unique GNS-Fock representa-
tion πω⊳
R
of W⊳ on Hω⊳
R
= F(S(⊳)R) and, hence, a quantum field theory for
the spacetime consisting of the right wedge alone.
The Minkowski vacuum state ωM of W also determines a state ω⊳M of
W⊳, by restriction (i.e., ω⊳M := ωM |W⊳). Thus, we may apply the GNS con-
struction to obtain the Minkowski representation (πω⊳
M
,Hω⊳
M
) of W⊳. It can
be shown (using the “Reeh-Schlieder theorem” — see Clifton and Halvor-
son [2000]) that ω⊳M is a highly mixed state (unlike ω
⊳
R). Therefore, πω⊳M is
reducible.
To obtain a concrete picture of this representation, note that (again, as a
consequence of the “Reeh-Schlieder theorem”) ΩωM is a cyclic vector for the
subalgebra πωM (W⊳) acting on the “global” Fock space F(SM). Thus, by the
uniqueness of the GNS representation (πω⊳
M
,Hω⊳
M
), it is unitarily equivalent
to the representation (πωM |W⊳ ,F(SM)). It can be shown that πωM (W⊳)′′ is
a factor (Horuzhy ([1988], Thm. 3.3.4). Thus, while reducible, πω⊳
M
is still
factorial.
Under the liberal approach to observables, the representations πω⊳
M
(fac-
torial) and πω⊳
R
(irreducible) provide physically inequivalent descriptions of
the physics in the right wedge.
Proposition 7. The Minkowski and Rindler representations of W⊳ are dis-
joint.
Now let ⊲ denote the left Rindler wedge, and define the subspace S(⊲) of
S as S(⊳) was defined above. (Of course, by symmetry, Proposition 7 holds
for W⊲ as well.) Let W⊲⊳ :=W[S(⊲)⊕ S(⊳), σ] denote the Weyl algebra over
the symplectic space (S(⊲) ⊕ S(⊳), σ). Then W⊲⊳ = W⊲ ⊗ W⊳, and ω⊲⊳M :=
ωM |W⊲⊳ is pure (Kay [1985], Defn., Thm. 1.3(iii)).11 The GNS representation
ω⊲⊳M induces is therefore irreducible, and (again invoking the uniqueness of
the GNS representation) it is equivalent to (πωM |W⊲⊳ ,F(SM)) (since ΩωM ∈
F(SM) is a cyclic vector for the subalgebra πωM (W⊲⊳) as well).
11The restriction of ωM to W⊲⊳ is a pure “quasifree” state. Thus, there is a complex
structure M ′ on S(⊲)⊕ S(⊳) such that
ωM (W (f)) = exp(−σ(f,M ′f)/4) = exp(−σ(f,Mf)/4), (45)
for all f ∈ S(⊲) ⊕ S(⊳) (Petz [1990], Prop. 3.9). It is not difficult to see then that
M |S(⊲)⊕S(⊳) = M ′ and therefore that M leaves S(⊲) ⊕ S(⊳) invariant. Hereafter, we will
use M to denote the complex structure on S as well as its restriction to S(⊲)⊕ S(⊳).
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The tensor product of the pure left and right Rindler vacua ω⊲⊳R := ω
⊲
R⊗ω⊳R
is of course also a pure state ofW⊲⊳.12 It will induce a GNS representation of
the latter on the Hilbert space Hω⊲⊳
R
given by F(SR) ≡ F(S(⊲)R)⊗F(S(⊳)R).
It is not difficult to show that ω⊲⊳R and ω
⊲⊳
M , both now irreducible, are also
disjoint.
Proposition 8. The Minkowski and Rindler representations of W⊲⊳ are dis-
joint.
In our final main section we shall discuss the conceptually problematic
implications that the M-vacuum states ω⊲⊳M and ω
⊳
M have for the presence
of R-quanta in the double and right wedge spacetime regions. However, we
note here an important difference between Rindler and Minkowski observers.
The total number of R-quanta, according to a Rindler observer confined
to the left (resp., right) wedge, is represented by the number operator N⊲
(resp., N⊳) on F(S(⊲)R) (resp., F(S(⊳)R)). However, because of the space-
like separation of the wedges, no single Rindler observer has access, even
in principle, to the expectation value of the “overall” total Rindler number
operator NR = N⊲ ⊗ I + I ⊗N⊳ acting on F(S(⊲)R)⊗F(S(⊳)R).
The reverse is true for a Minkowski observer. While she has access, at
least in principle, to the total number of M-quanta operator NM acting on
F(SM), NM is a purely global observable that does not split into the sum
of two separate number operators associated with the left and right wedges
(as a general consequence of the “Reeh-Schlieder theorem” — see Redhead
[1995]). In fact, since the Minkowski complex structure M is an “anti-local”
operator (Segal and Goodman [1965]), it fails to leave either of the subspaces
S(⊲) or S(⊳) invariant, and it follows that no M-quanta number operator is
affiliated with πω⊳
M
(W⊳)′′.13 Thus, even a liberal about observables must say
that a Minkowski observer with access only to the right wedge does not have
the capability of counting M-quanta.
So, while it might be sensible to ask for the probability in state ω⊳M that
a Rindler observer detects particles in the right wedge, it is not sensible to
ask, conversely, for the probability in state ω⊳R that a Minkowski observer will
12More precisely, ω⊳
R
arises from a complex structure R⊳ on S(⊳), ω
⊲
R
arises from a
complex structure R⊲ on S(⊲), and ω
⊲⊳
R
arises from the complex structure R⊲ ⊕ R⊳ of
S(⊲)⊕S(⊳). When no confusion can result, we will use R to denote the complex structure
on S(⊲)⊕ S(⊳) and its restriction to S(⊳).
13See Halvorson [2000b] for further details and a critical analysis of different approaches
to the problem of particle localization in quantum field theory.
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detect particles in the right wedge. Note also that since NM is a purely global
observable (i.e., there is no sense to be made of “the number of Minkowski
quanta in a bounded spatial or spacetime region”), what a Minkowski ob-
server might locally detect with a “particle detector” (over an extended, but
finite, interval of time) can at best give an approximate indication of the
global Minkowski particle content of the field.
4 Minkowski versus Rindler Quanta
We have seen that a Rindler observer will construct “his quantum field the-
ory” of the right wedge spacetime region differently from a Minkowski ob-
server. He will use the complex structure R picked out uniquely by the
boost group about O, and build up a representation ofW⊳ on the Fock space
F(S(⊳)R). However, suppose that the state of W⊳ is the state ω⊳M of no
particles (globally!) according to a Minkowski observer. What, if anything,
will our Rindler observer say about the particle content in the right wedge?
And does this question even make sense?
We shall argue that it does, notwithstanding the disjointness of the Minkowski
and Rindler representations. And the answer is surprising. Not only does
a Rindler observer have a nonzero chance of detecting the presence of R-
quanta. In section 4.2 we shall show that if our Rindler observer were able
to build a detector sensitive to the total number of R-quanta in the right
wedge, he would always find that the probability of an infinite total number
is one!
We begin in section 4.1 by discussing the paradox of observer-dependence
of particles to which such results lead. In particular, we shall criticize Teller’s
([1995,1996]) resolution of this paradox. Later, in section 4.3, we shall also
criticize the arguments of Arageorgis [1995] and Arageorgis et al [2000] for
the incommensurability of inequivalent particle concepts, and argue, instead,
for their complementarity (in support of Teller).
4.1 The Paradox of the Observer-Dependence of Par-
ticles
Not surprisingly, physicists initially found a Rindler observer’s ability to de-
tect particles in the Minkowski vacuum paradoxical (see Ru¨ger [1989], p.
571; Teller [1995], p. 110). After all, particles are the sorts of things that are
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either there or not there, so how could their presence depend on an observer’s
state of motion?
One way to resist this paradox is to reject from the outset the physi-
cality of the Rindler representation, thereby withholding bona fide particle
status from Rindler quanta. For instance, one could be bothered by the
fact the Rindler representation cannot be globally defined over the whole of
Minkowski spacetime, or that the one-particle Rindler Hamiltonian lacks a
mass gap, allowing an arbitrarily large number of R-quanta to have a fixed
finite amount of energy (“infrared divergence”). Arageorgis ([1995], Ch. 6)
gives a thorough discussion of these and other “pathologies” of the Rindler
representation.14 In consequence, he argues that the phenomenology associ-
ated with a Rindler observer’s “particle detections” in the Minkowski vac-
uum ought to be explained entirely in terms of observables affiliated to the
Minkowski representation (such as garden-variety Minkowski vacuum fluctu-
ations of the local field observables).
This is not the usual response to the paradox of observer-dependence.
Ru¨ger [1989] has characterized the majority of physicists’ responses in terms
of the field approach and the detector approach. Proponents of the field ap-
proach emphasize the need to forfeit particle talk at the fundamental level,
and to focus the discussion on measurement of local field quantities. Those
of the detector approach emphasize the need to relativize particle talk to the
behaviour of concrete detectors following specified world-lines. Despite their
differing emphases, and the technical difficulties in unifying these programs
(well-documented by Arageorgis [1995]), neither eschews the Rindler repre-
sentation as unphysical, presumably because of its deep connections with
quantum statistical mechanics and blackhole thermodynamics (Sciama et al
[1981]). Moreover, pathological or not, it remains of philosophical interest to
examine the consequences of taking the Rindler representation seriously —
just as the possibility of time travel in general relativity admitted by certain
“pathological” solutions to Einstein’s field equations is of interest. And it
is remarkable that there should be any region of Minkowski spacetime that
admits two physically inequivalent quantum field descriptions.
Teller ([1995,1996]) has recently offered his own resolution of the paradox.
We reproduce below the relevant portions of his discussion in Teller ([1995],
p. 111). However, note that he does not distinguish between left and right
Rindler observers, |0;M〉 refers, in our notation, to the Minkowski vacuum
14See also, more recently, Belinski˘i [1997], Fedotov et al. [1999], and Nikolic´ [2000].
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vector ΩωM ∈ F(SM), and |1, 0, 0, . . . 〉M (resp., |1, 0, 0, . . . 〉R) is a one-particle
state 0⊕ f ⊕ 0⊕ 0⊕ · · · ∈ F(SM) (resp., ∈ F(SR)).
. . . Rindler raising and lowering operators are expressible as su-
perpositions of the Minkowski raising and lowering operators, and
states with a definite number of Minkowski quanta are superpo-
sitions of states with different numbers of Rindler quanta. In
particular, |0;M〉 is a superposition of Rindler quanta states, in-
cluding states for arbitrarily large numbers of Rindler quanta. In
other words, |0;M〉 has an exact value of zero for the Minkowski
number operator, and is simultaneously highly indefinite for the
Rindler number operator.
...In |0;M〉 there is no definite number of Rindler quanta. There
is only a propensity for detection of one or another number of
Rindler quanta by an accelerating detector. A state in which a
quantity has no exact value is one in which no values for that
quantity are definitely, and so actually, exemplified. Thus in
|0;M〉 no Rindler quanta actually occur, so the status of |0;M〉
as a state completely devoid of quanta is not impugned.
To be sure, this interpretive state of affairs is surprising. To
spell it out one step further, in |1, 0, 0, . . . 〉M there is one actual
Minkowski quantum, no actual Rindler quanta, and all sorts of
propensities for manifestation of Rindler quanta, among other
things. In |1, 0, 0, . . . 〉R the same comment applies with the role
of Minkowski and Rindler reversed. It turns out that there are
various kinds of quanta, and a state in which one kind of quanta
actually occurs is a state in which there are only propensities
for complementary kinds of quanta. Surprising, but perfectly
consistent and coherent.
Teller’s point is that R-quanta only exist (so to speak) potentially in the
M-vacuum, not actually. Thus it is still an invariant observer-independent
fact that there are no actual quanta in the field, and the paradox evaporates.
Similarly for Minkowski states of one or more particles as seen by Rindler ob-
servers. There is the same definite number of actual quanta for all observers.
Thus, since actual particles are the “real stuff”, the real stuff is invariant!
Notice, however, that there is something self-defeating in Teller’s final
concession, urged by advocates of the field and detector approaches, that
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different kinds of quanta need to be distinguished. For if we do draw the
distinction sharply, it is no longer clear why even the actual presence of R-
quanta in the M-vacuum should bother us. Teller seems to want to have it
both ways: while there are different kinds of quanta, there is still only one
kind of actual quanta, and it better be invariant.
Does this invariance really hold? In one sense, Yes. Disjointness does not
prevent us from building Rindler creation and annihilation operators on the
Minkowski representation space F(SM). We simply need to define Rindler
analogues, a∗R(f) and aR(f), of the Minkowski creation and annihilation op-
erators via Eqns. (37) with Φ(Rf) in place of Φ(if) (= Φ(Mf)) (noting that
f 7→ aR(f) will now be anti-linear with respect to the Rindler conjugation
R). It is then easy to see, using (34), that
aR(f) = 2
−1[a∗M((I +MR)f) + aM ((I −MR)f)]. (46)
This linear combination would be trivial if R = ±M . However, we know
R 6= M , and R = −M is ruled out because it is inconsistent with both
complex structures being positive definite. Consequently, Ωω⊲⊳
M
must be
a nontrivial superposition of eigenstates of the Rindler number operator
NR(f) := a
∗
R(f)aR(f); for an easy calculation, using (46), reveals that
NR(f)Ωω⊲⊳
M
= 2−2[Ωω⊲⊳
M
+ a∗M((I −MR)f)a∗M ((I +MR)f)Ωω⊲⊳M ], (47)
which (the presence of the nonzero second term guarantees) is not a sim-
ply a multiple of Ωω⊲⊳
M
. Thus, Teller would be correct to conclude that the
Minkowski vacuum implies dispersion in the number operator NR(f). And
the same conclusion would follow if, instead, we considered the Minkowski
creation and annihilation operators as acting on the Rindler representation
space F(SR). Since only finitely many degrees of freedom are involved, this
is guaranteed by the Stone-von Neumann theorem.
However, therein lies the rub. NR(f) merely represents the number of
R-quanta with a specified wavefunction f . What about the total number of
R-quanta in theM-vacuum (which involves all degrees of freedom)? If Teller
cannot assure us that this too has dispersion, his case for the invariance of
“actual quanta” is left in tatters. In his discussion, Teller fails to distinguish
NR(f) from the total number operator NR, but the distinction is crucial. It
is a well-known consequence of the disjointness of πω⊲⊳
R
and πω⊲⊳
M
that neither
representation’s total number operator is definable on the Hilbert space of
the other (BR [1996], Thm. 5.2.14). Therefore, it is literally nonsense to
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speak of Ωω⊲⊳
M
as a superposition of eigenstates of NR!
15 If xn, xm ∈ F(SR) are
eigenstates of NR with eigenvalues n,m respectively, then xn+ xm again lies
in F(SR), and so is “orthogonal” to all eigenstates of the Minkowski number
operator NM acting on F(SM). And, indeed, taking infinite sums of Rindler
number eigenstates will again leave us in the folium of the Rindler repre-
sentation. As Arageorgis ([1995], p. 303) has also noted: “The Minkowski
vacuum state is not a superposition of Rindler quanta states, despite ‘ap-
pearances’ ”.16
Yet this point, by itself, does not tell us that Teller’s discussion cannot be
salvaged. Recall that a state ρ is dispersion-free on a (bounded) observable X
just in case ρ(X2) = ρ(X)2. Suppose, now, that Y is a possibly unbounded
observable that is definable in some representation π of W. We can then
rightly say that an algebraic state ρ of W predicts dispersion in Y just in
case, for every extension ρˆ of ρ to π(W)′′, ρˆ is not dispersion-free on all
bounded functions of Y . We then have the following result.
Proposition 9. If J1, J2 are distinct complex structures on (S, σ), then ωJ1
(resp., ωJ2) predicts dispersion in NJ2 (resp., NJ1).
As a consequence, the Minkowski vacuum ω⊲⊳M indeed predicts dispersion in
15In their review of Teller’s [1995] book, Huggett and Weingard [1996] question whether
Teller’s “quanta interpretation” of quantum field theory can be implemented in the context
of inequivalent representations. However, when they discuss Teller’s resolution of the
observer-dependence paradox, in terms of mere propensities to display R-quanta in theM -
vacuum, they write “This seems all well and good” ([1996], p. 309)! Their only criticism
is the obvious one: legitimizing such propensity talk ultimately requires a solution to the
measurement problem. Teller’s response to their review is equally unsatisfactory. Though
he pays lip-service to the possibility of inequivalent representations ([1998], pp. 156-7), he
fails to notice how inequivalence undercuts his discussion of the paradox.
16Arageorgis presumes Teller’s discussion is based upon the appearance of the following
purely formal (i.e., non-normalizable) expression for Ωω⊲⊳
M
as a superposition in F(SR) ≡
F(S(⊲)R) ⊗ F(S(⊳)R) over left (“I”) and right (“II”) Rindler modes (Wald [1994], Eqn.
(5.1.27)):
∏
i
{
∞∑
n=0
exp(−nπωi/a) |niI〉 ⊗ |niII〉
}
.
However, it bears mentioning that, as this expression suggests: (a) the restriction of ω⊲⊳
M
to either W⊲ or W⊳ is indeed mixed; (b) ω⊲⊳M can be shown rigorously to be an entangled
state of W⊲ ⊗W⊳ (Clifton and Halvorson [2000]); and (c) the thermal properties of the
“reduced density matrix” for either wedge obtained from this formal expression can be
derived rigorously (Kay [1985]). In addition, see Propositions 9 and 10 below!
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the Rindler total number operator NR (and in both N⊲ ⊗ I and I ⊗ N⊳,
invoking the symmetry between the wedges).
Teller also writes of the Minkowski vacuum as being a superposition of
eigenstates of the Rindler number operator with arbitrary large eigenvalues.
Eschewing the language of superposition, the idea that there is no finite
number of R-quanta to which the M-vacuum assigns probability one can
also be rendered sensible. The relevant result was first proved by Fulling
([1972], Appendix F; [1989], p. 145):
Fulling’s “Theorem”. Two Fock vacuum representations (π,F(H),Ω) and
(π′,F(H′),Ω′) ofW are unitarily equivalent if and only if 〈Ω, N ′Ω〉 <∞ (or,
equivalently, 〈Ω′, NΩ′〉 <∞).
As stated, this “theorem” also fails to make sense, because it is only in
the case where the representations are already equivalent that the primed
total number operator is definable on the unprimed representation space
and an expression like “〈Ω, N ′Ω〉” is well-defined. (We say more about why
this is so in the next section.) However, there is a way to understand the
expression “〈Ω, N ′Ω〉 < ∞” (resp., “〈Ω, N ′Ω〉 = ∞”) in a rigorous, non-
question-begging way. We can take it to be the claim that all extensions ρˆ of
the abstract unprimed vacuum state ofW to B(F(H′)) assign (resp., do not
assign) N ′ a finite value; i.e., for any such extension,
∑∞
n′=1 ρˆ(Pn′)n
′ converges
(resp., does not converge), where {Pn′} are the spectral projections of N ′.
With this understanding, the following rigorization of Fulling’s “theorem”
can then be proved.
Proposition 10. A pair of Fock representations πωJ1 , πωJ2 are unitarily
equivalent if and only if ωJ1 assigns NJ2 a finite value (equivalently, ωJ2
assigns NJ1 a finite value).
It follows that ω⊲⊳M cannot assign probability one to any finite number of
R-quanta (and vice-versa, with R↔M).
Unfortunately, neither Proposition 9 or 10 is sufficient to rescue Teller’s
“actual quanta” invariance argument, for these propositions give no further
information about the shape of the probability distribution that ω⊲⊳M pre-
scribes for NR’s eigenvalues. In particular, both propositions are compatible
with there being a probability of one that at least n > 0 R-quanta obtain
in the M-vacuum, for any n ∈ N. If that were the case, Teller would then
be forced to withdraw and concede that at least some, and perhaps many,
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Rindler quanta actually occur in a state with no actual Minkowski quanta.
In the next section, we shall show that this — Teller’s worst nightmare — is
in fact the case.
4.2 Minkowski Probabilities for Rindler Number Op-
erators
We now defend the claim that a Rindler observer will say that there are
actually infinitely many quanta while the field is in the Minkowski vacuum
state (or, indeed, in any other state of the Minkowski folium).17 This result
applies more generally to any pair of disjoint regular representations, at least
one of which is the GNS representation of an abstract Fock vacuum state.
We shall specialize back down to the Minkowski/Rindler case later on.
Let ρ be a regular state of W inducing the GNS representation (πρ,Hρ),
and let ωJ be the abstract vacuum state determined by a complex structure J
on (S, σ). The case we are interested in is, of course, when πρ, πωJ are disjoint.
We first want to show how to define representation-independent probabilities
in the state ρ for any J-quanta number operator that “counts” the number
of quanta with wavefunctions in a fixed finite-dimensional subspace F ⊆ SJ .
(Parts of our exposition below follow BR ([1996], pp. 26-30), which may be
consulted for further details.)
We know that, for any f ∈ S, there exists a self-adjoint operator Φρ(f)
on Hρ such that
πρ(W (tf)) = exp (itΦρ(f)) , t ∈ R. (48)
We can also define unbounded annihilation and creation operators on Hρ for
J-quanta by
aρ(f) := 2
−1/2(Φρ(f) + iΦρ(Jf)), a
∗
ρ(f) := 2
−1/2(Φρ(f)− iΦρ(Jf)). (49)
Earlier, we denoted these operators by aJ(f) and a
∗
J(f). However, we now
want to emphasize the representation space upon which they act; and only
17In fact, this was first proved, in effect, by Chaiken [1967]. However his lengthy analysis
focussed on comparing Fock with non-Fock (so-called “strange”) representations of the
Weyl algebra, and the implications of his result for disjoint Fock representations based on
inequivalent one-particle structures seem not to have been carried down into the textbook
tradition of the subject. (The closest result we have found is BR ([1996], Thm. 5.2.14)
which we are able to employ as a lemma to recover Chaiken’s result for disjoint Fock
representations — see the appendix.)
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the single complex structure J shall concern us in our general discussion, so
there is no possibility of confusion with others.
Next, define a “quadratic form” nρ(F ) : Hρ 7→ R+. The domain of nρ(F )
is
D(nρ(F )) :=
⋂
f∈F
D(aρ(f)), (50)
where D(aρ(f)) is the domain of aρ(f). Now let {fk : k = 1, . . . , m} be some
J-orthonormal basis for F , and define
[nρ(F )](ψ) :=
m∑
k=1
‖aρ(fk)ψ‖2, (51)
for any ψ ∈ D(nρ(F )). It can be shown that the sum in (51) is independent
of the chosen orthonormal basis for F , and that D(nρ(F )) lies dense in Hρ.
Given any densely defined, positive, closed quadratic form t on Hρ, there
exists a unique positive self-adjoint operator T on Hρ such that D(t) =
D(T 1/2) and
t(ψ) = 〈T 1/2ψ, T 1/2ψ〉, ψ ∈ D(t). (52)
We let Nρ(F ) denote the finite-subspace J-quanta number operator on Hρ
arising from the quadratic form nρ(F ).
We seek a representation-independent value for “Probρ(N(F ) ∈ ∆)”,
where ∆ ⊆ N. So let τ be any regular state of W, and let Nτ (F ) be
the corresponding number operator on Hτ . Let WF be the Weyl algebra
over (F, σ|F ), and let Eτ (F ) denote the spectral measure for Nτ (F ) acting
on Hτ . Then, [Eτ (F )](∆) (the spectral projection representing the propo-
sition “Nτ (F ) ∈ ∆”) is in the weak closure of πτ (WF ), by the Stone-von
Neumann uniqueness theorem. In particular, there is a net {Ai} ⊆ WF such
that πτ (Ai) converges weakly to [Eτ (F )](∆). Now, the Stone-von Neumann
uniqueness theorem also entails that there is a density operator Dρ on Hτ
such that
ρ(A) = Tr(Dρπτ (A)), A ∈ WF . (53)
We therefore define
Probρ(N(F ) ∈ ∆) := lim
i
ρ(Ai) (54)
= lim
i
Tr(Dρπτ (Ai)) (55)
= Tr(Dρ[Eτ (F )](∆)). (56)
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The final equality displays that this definition is independent of the chosen
approximating net {πτ (Ai)}, and the penultimate equality displays that this
definition is independent of the (regular) representation πτ . In particular,
since we may take τ = ρ, it follows that
Probρ(N(F ) ∈ ∆) = 〈Ωρ, [Eρ(F )](∆)Ωρ〉, (57)
exactly as expected.
We can also define a positive, closed quadratic form on Hρ corresponding
to the total J-quanta number operator by:
nρ(ψ) = sup
F∈F
[nρ(F )](ψ) , (58)
D(nρ) =
{
ψ ∈ Hρ : ψ ∈
⋂
f∈S
D(aρ(f)), nρ(ψ) <∞
}
, (59)
where F denotes the collection of all finite-dimensional subspaces of SJ . If
D(nρ) is dense in Hρ, then it makes sense to say that the total J-quanta
number operator Nρ exists on the Hilbert space Hρ. In general, however,
D(nρ) will not be dense, and may contain only the 0 vector. Accordingly,
we cannot use a direct analogue to Eqn. (56) to define the probability, in the
state ρ, that there are, say, n or fewer J-quanta.
However, we can still proceed as follows. Fix n ∈ N, and suppose F ⊆
F ′ with both F, F ′ ∈ F. Since any state with n or fewer J-quanta with
wavefunctions in F ′ cannot have more than n J-quanta with wavefunctions
in the (smaller) subspace F ,
Probρ(N(F ) ∈ [0, n]) ≥ Probρ(N(F ′) ∈ [0, n]). (60)
Thus, whatever value we obtain for “Probρ(N ∈ [0, n])”, it should satisfy the
inequality
Probρ(N(F ) ∈ [0, n]) ≥ Probρ(N ∈ [0, n]), (61)
for any finite-dimensional subspace F ⊆ SJ . However, the following result
holds.
Proposition 11. If ρ is a regular state of W disjoint from the Fock state
ωJ , then infF∈F
{
Prob ρ(NF ∈ [0, n])
}
= 0 for every n ∈ N.
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Thus ρ must assign every finite number of J-quanta probability zero; i.e., ρ
predicts an infinite number of J-quanta with probability 1!
Let us tighten this up some more. Suppose that we are in any regular
representation (πω,Hω) in which the total J-quanta number operator Nω
exists and is affiliated to πω(W)′′. (For example, we may take the Fock
representation where ω = ωJ .) Let Eω denote the spectral measure of Nω on
Hω. Considering ρ as a state of πω(W), it is then reasonable to define
Probρ(N ∈ [0, n]) := ρˆ(Eω([0, n])), (62)
where ρˆ is any extension of ρ to πω(W)′′, provided the right-hand side takes
the same value for all extensions. (And, of course, it will when ρ ∈ F(πω),
where (62) reduces to the standard definition.) Now clearly
[Eω(F )]([0, n]) ≥ Eω([0, n]), F ∈ F. (63)
(“If there are at most n J-quanta in total, then there are at most n J-quanta
whose wavefunctions lie in any finite-dimensional subspace of SJ”.) Since
states preserve order relations between projections, every extension ρˆ must
therefore satisfy
Probρ(N(F ) ∈ [0, n]) = ρˆ([Eω(F )]([0, n])) ≥ ρˆ(Eω([0, n])). (64)
Thus, if ρ is disjoint from ω, Proposition 11 entails that Probρ(N ∈ [0, n]) = 0
for all finite n.18
As an immediate consequence of this and the disjointness of the Minkowski
and Rindler representations, we have (reverting back to our earlier number
operator notation):
Probω
⊲⊳
M (NR ∈ [0, n]) = 0 = Probω⊲⊳R (NM ∈ [0, n]), for all n ∈ N, (65)
Probω
⊲
M (N⊲ ∈ [0, n]) = 0 = Probω⊳M (N⊳ ∈ [0, n]), for all n ∈ N. (66)
The same probabilities obtain when the Minkowski vacuum is replaced with
any other state normal in the Minkowski representation.19 So it could not be
18Notice that such a prediction could never be made by a state in the folium of πω, since
normal states are countably additive (see note 3).
19This underscores the utter bankruptcy, from the standpoint of the liberal about ob-
servables, in taking the weak equivalence of the Minkowski and Rindler representations to
be sufficient for their physical equivalence. Yes, every Rindler state of the Weyl algebra is
a weak* limit of Minkowski states. But the former all predict a finite number of Rindler
quanta with probability 1, while the latter all predict an infinite number with probability
1! (Wald ([1994], pp. 82-3) makes the exact same point with respect to states that do and
do not satisfy the “Hadamard” property.)
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farther from the truth to say that there is merely the potential for Rindler
quanta in the Minkowski vacuum, or any other eigenstate of NM .
One must be careful, however, with an informal statement like “The M-
vacuum contains infinitely many R-quanta with probability 1”. Since Rindler
wedges are unbounded, there is nothing unphysical, or otherwise metaphysi-
cally incoherent, about thinking of wedges as containing an infinite number of
Rindler quanta. But we must not equate this with the quite different empiri-
cal claim “A Rindler observer’s particle detector has the sure-fire disposition
to register the value ‘∞’ ”. There is no such value! Rather, the empirical
content of equations (65) and (66) is simply that an idealized “two-state”
measuring apparatus designed to register whether there are > n Rindler
quanta in the Minkowski vacuum will always return the answer ‘Yes’. This
is a perfectly sensible physical disposition for a measuring device to have. Of
course, we are not pretending to have in hand a specification of the physical
details of such a device. Indeed, when physicists model particle detectors,
these are usually assumed to couple to specific “modes” of the field, repre-
sented by finite-subspace, not total, number operators (cf., e.g., Wald [1994],
Sec. 3.3). But this is really beside the point, since Teller advertises his reso-
lution of the paradox as a way to avoid a “retreat to instrumentalism” about
the particle concept ([1995], p. 110).
On Teller’s behalf, one might object that there are still no grounds for
saying any R-quanta obtain in the M-vacuum, since for any particular num-
ber n of R-quanta you care to name, equations (65) and (66) entail that n
is not the number of R-quanta in the M-vacuum. But remember that the
same is true for n = 0, and that, therefore, n ≥ 1 R-quanta has probability
1! A further tack might be to deny that probability 0 for n = 0, or any other
n, entails impossibility or non-actuality of that number of R-quanta. This
would be similar to a common move made in response to the lottery paradox,
in the hypothetical case where there are an infinite number of ticket holders.
Since someone has to win, each ticket holder must still have the potential
to win, even though his or her probability of winning is zero. The difficulty
with this response is that in the Rindler case, we have no independent reason
to think that some particular finite number of R-quanta has to be detected
at all. Moreover, if we were to go soft on taking probability 0 to be sufficient
for “not actual”, we should equally deny that probability 1 is sufficient for
“actual”, and by Teller’s lights the paradox would go away at a stroke (be-
cause there could never be actual Rindler or Minkowski quanta in any field
state).
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We conclude that Teller’s resolution of the paradox of observer-dependence
of particles fails. And so be it, since it was ill-motivated in the first place.
We already indicated in the previous subsection that it should be enough of
a resolution to recognize that there are different kinds of quanta. We believe
the physicists of the field and detector approaches are correct to bite the
bullet hard on this, even though it means abandoning na¨ive realism about
particles (though not, of course, about detection events). We turn, next, to
arguing that a coherent story can still be told about the relationship between
the different kinds of particle talk used by different observers.
4.3 Incommensurable or Complementary?
At the beginning of this paper, we reproduced a passage from Jauch’s amus-
ing Galilean dialogue on the question “Are Quanta Real?”. In that passage,
Sagredo is glorying in the prospect that complementarity may be applicable
even in classical physics; and, more generally, to solving the philosophical
problem of the specificity of individual events versus the generality of sci-
entific description. It is well-known that Bohr himself sought to extend the
idea of complementarity to all different walks of life, beyond its originally
intended application in quantum theory. And even within the confines of
quantum theory, it is often the case that when the going gets tough, tough
quantum theorists cloak themselves in the mystical profundity of comple-
mentarity, sometimes just to get philosophers off their backs.
So it seems with the following notorious comments of a well-known advo-
cate of the detector approach that have received a predictably cool reception
from philosophers:
Bohr taught us that quantum mechanics is an algorithm for com-
puting the results of measurements. Any discussion about what
is a “real, physical vacuum”, must therefore be related to the be-
haviour of real, physical measuring devices, in this case particle-
number detectors. Armed with such heuristic devices, we may
then assert the following. There are quantum states and there
are particle detectors. Quantum field theory enables us to pre-
dict probabilistically how a particular detector will respond to
that state. That is all. That is all there can ever be in physics,
because physics is about the observations and measurements that
we can make in the world. We can’t talk meaningfully about
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whether such-and-such a state contains particles except in the
context of a specified particle detector measurement. To claim
(as some authors occasionally do!) that when a detector responds
(registers particles) in somebody’s cherished vacuum state that
the particles concerned are “fictitious” or “quasi-particles”, or
that the detector is being “misled” or “distorted”, is an empty
statement (Davies [1984], p. 69).
We shall argue that, cleansed of Davies’ purely operationalist reading of
Bohr, complementarity does, after all, shed light on the relation between
inequivalent particle concepts.
Ru¨ger [1989] balks at this idea. He writes:
The “real problem” — how to understand how there might be
particles for one observer, but none at all for another observer
in a different state of motion — is not readily solved by an ap-
peal to Copenhagenism... Though quantum mechanics can tell us
that the properties of micro-objects (like momentum or energy)
depend in a sense on observers measuring them, the standard
interpretation of the theory still does not tell us that whether
there is a micro-object or not depends on observers. At least the
common form of this interpretation is not of immediate help here
(Ru¨ger [1989], pp. 575-6).
Well, let us consider the “common form” of the Copenhagen interpretation.
Whatever one’s preferred embellishment of the interpretation, it must at least
imply that observables represented by noncommuting “complementary” self-
adjoint operators cannot have simultaneously determinate values in all states.
Since field quantizations are built upon an abstract noncommutative algebra,
the Weyl algebra, complementarity retains its application to quantum field
theory. In particular, in any single Fock space representation — setting
aside inequivalent representations for the moment — there will be a total
number operator and nontrivial superpositions of its eigenstates. In these
superpositions, which are eigenstates of observables failing to commute with
the number operator, it is therefore perfectly in line with complementarity
that we say they contain no actual particles in any substantive sense.20 In
20As Ru¨ger notes earlier ([1989], p. 571), in ordinary non-field-theoretic quantum theory,
complementarity only undermined a na¨ive substance-properties ontology. However, this
was only because there was no “number of quanta” observable in the theory!
43
addition, there will be different number operators on Fock space that count
the number of quanta with wavefunctions lying in different subspaces of the
one-particle space, and they will only commute if the corresponding subspaces
are compatible. So even before we consider inequivalent particle concepts,
we must already accept that there are different complementary “kinds” of
quanta, according to what their wavefunctions are.
Does complementarity extend to the particle concepts associated with
inequivalent Fock representations? Contra Ru¨ger [1989], we claim that it
does. We saw earlier that one can build finite-subspace J-quanta number
operators in any regular representation of W[S, σ], provided only that J
defines a proper complex structure on S that leaves it invariant. In particular,
using the canonical commutation relation [Φ(f),Φ(g)] = iσ(f, g)I, a tedious
but elementary calculation reveals that, for any f, g ∈ S,
[NJ1(f), NJ2(g)]
= i/2{σ(f, g)[Φ(f),Φ(g)]+ + σ(f, J2g)[Φ(f),Φ(J2g)]+ (67)
+σ(J1f, g)[Φ(J1f),Φ(g)]+ + σ(J1f, J2g)[Φ(J1f),Φ(J2g)]+},
in any regular representation.21 Thus, there are well-defined and, in general,
nontrivial commutation relations between finite-subspace number operators,
even when the associated particle concepts are inequivalent. We also saw in
Eqn. (47) that when J2 6= J1, no NJ2(f), for any f ∈ SJ2 , will leave the
zero-particle subspace of NJ1 invariant. Since it is a necessary condition that
this nondegenerate eigenspace be left invariant by any self-adjoint operator
commuting with NJ1, it follows that [NJ2(f), NJ1] 6= 0 for all f ∈ SJ2. Thus
finite-subspace number operators for one kind of quanta are complementary
to the total number operators of inequivalent kinds of quanta.
Of course, we cannot give the same argument for complementarity be-
tween the total number operators NJ1 and NJ2 pertaining to inequivalent
kinds of quanta, because, as we know, they cannot even be defined as opera-
tors on the same Hilbert space. However, we disagree with Arageorgis ([1995],
pp. 303-4) that this means Teller’s “complementarity talk” in relation to the
Minkowski and Rindler total number operators is wholly inapplicable. We
have two reasons for the disagreement.
21As a check on expression (67), note that it is invariant under the one-particle space
phase transformations f → (cos t + J1 sin t)f and g → (cos t + J2 sin t)g, and when J1 =
J2 = J , reduces to zero just in case the rays generated by f and g are compatible subspaces
of SJ .
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First, since it is a necessary condition that a (possibly unbounded) self-
adjoint observable Y on HωJ1 commuting with NJ1 have ΩωJ1 as an eigenvec-
tor, it is also necessary that the abstract vacuum state ωJ1 be dispersion-free
on Y . But this latter condition is purely algebraic and makes sense even
when Y does not act on HωJ1 . Moreover, as Proposition 9 shows, this con-
dition fails when Y is taken to be the total number operator of any Fock
representation inequivalent to πωJ1 . So it is entirely natural to treat Propo-
sition 9 as a vindication of the idea that inequivalent pairs of total number
operators are complementary.
Secondly, we have seen that any state in the folium of a representation
associated with one kind of quanta assigns probability zero to any finite
number of an inequivalent kind of quanta. This has a direct analogue in the
most famous instance of complementarity: that which obtains between the
concepts of position and momentum.
Consider the unbounded position and momentum operators, x and p (=
−i ∂
∂x
), acting on L2(R). Let Ex and Ep be their spectral measures. We say
that a state ρ of B(L2(R)) assigns x a finite dispersion-free value just in case
ρ is dispersion-free on x and there is a λ ∈ R such that ρ(Ex((a, b))) = 1
if and only if λ ∈ (a, b). (Similarly, for p.) Then the following is a direct
consequence of the canonical commutation relation [x, p] = iI (see Halvorson
and Clifton [1999], Prop. 3.7).
Proposition 12. If ρ is a state of B(L2(R)) that assigns x (resp., p) a finite
dispersion-free value, then ρ(Ep((a, b))) = 0 (resp., ρ(Ex((a, b))) = 0) for any
a, b ∈ R.
This result makes rigorous the fact, suggested by Fourier analysis, that if
either of x or p has a sharp finite value in any state, the other is “maximally
indeterminate”. But the same goes for pairs of inequivalent number operators
(NJ1, NJ2): if a regular state ρ assigns NJ1 a finite dispersion-free value, then
ρ ∈ F(πωJ1 ) which, in turn, entails that ρ assigns probability zero to any
finite set of eigenvalues for NJ2 . Thus, (NJ1, NJ2) are, in a natural sense,
maximally complementary, despite the fact that they have no well-defined
commutator.
One might object that our analogy is only skin deep; after all, x and p
still act on the same Hilbert space, L2(R)! So let us deepen the analogy. Let
W be the Weyl algebra for one degree of freedom, and let U(a) ≡ W (a, 0)
and V (b) ≡ W (0, b) be the unitary operators corresponding, respectively,
to position and momentum. Now, if we think of position as analogous to
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the Minkowski number operator and momentum as analogous to the Rindler
number operator, the standard Schro¨dinger representation is not the ana-
logue of the Minkowski vacuum representation — since the Minkowski vac-
uum representation is constructed so as to have eigenvectors for NM , whereas
the Schro¨dinger representation obviously does not have eigenvectors for x.
Thus, to find a representation analogous to the Minkowski vacuum repre-
sentation, first choose a state ρ of W that is dispersion-free on all elements
{U(a) : a ∈ R}. In particular, we may choose ρ such that ρ(U(a)) = eiaλ
for all a ∈ R. If we then let (πρ,Hρ,Ωρ) denote the GNS representation of
W induced by ρ, it follows that we may construct an unbounded position
operator x on Hρ which has Ωρ as an eigenvector with eigenvalue λ. But,
lo and behold, it is not possible to define a momentum operator p on the
Hilbert space Hρ.
Indeed, since ρ is dispersion-free on U(a), it is multiplicative for the
product of U(a) with any other element of W (KR [1997], Ex. 4.6.16).
In particular,
ρ(U(a))ρ(V (b)) = eiabρ(V (b))ρ(U(a)), a, b ∈ R. (68)
Since ρ(U(a)) = eiaλ 6= 0, this implies
ρ(V (b)) = eiabρ(V (b)), a, b ∈ R. (69)
However, when a 6= 0, (69) cannot hold for all b 6= 0 unless ρ(V (b)) = 0.
Thus,
〈Ωρ, πρ(V (b))Ωρ〉 = 0, ∀b 6= 0. (70)
On the other hand,
〈Ωρ, πρ(V (0))Ωρ〉 = 〈Ωρ, IΩρ〉 = 1. (71)
Thus, πρ(V (b)) is not weakly continuous in b, and there can be no self-
adjoint operator p on Hρ such that V (b) = eibp. On the other hand, since
a ∈ R 7→ ρ(U(a)) = eiaλ is continuous, and hence πρ is regular with respect
to the subgroup of unitary operators {U(a) : a ∈ R}, there is a position
operator on Hρ.
Similarly, if ω is a state of W that is dispersion-free on the momentum
unitary operators {V (b) : b ∈ R}, then it is not possible to define a position
operator on the Hilbert space Hω. Moreover, the GNS representations πρ and
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πω are disjoint — precisely as in the case of the GNS representations induced
by the Minkowski and Rindler vacuum states. Indeed, suppose for reductio
that there is a unitary operator T from Hω to Hρ such that T−1πρ(A)T =
πω(A) for all A ∈ W. Then, it would follow that πω(U(a)) = T−1πρ(U(a))T is
weakly continuous in a, in contradiction to the fact that x cannot be defined
on Hω.
So we maintain that there are compelling formal reasons for thinking of
Minkowski and Rindler quanta as complementary. What’s more, when a
Minkowski observer sets out to detect particles, her state of motion deter-
mines that her detector will be sensitive to the presence of Minkowski quanta.
Similarly for a Rindler observer and his detector. This is borne out by the
analysis of Unruh and Wald [1984] in which they show how his detector will
itself “define” (in a “nonstandard” way) what solutions of the relativistic
wave equation are counted as having positive frequency, via the way the de-
tector couples to the field. So we may think of the choice of an observer
to follow an inertial or Rindler trajectory through spacetime as analogous
to the choice between measuring the position or momentum of a particle.
Each choice requires a distinct kind of coupling to the system, and both
measurements cannot be executed on the field simultaneously and with infi-
nite precision.22 Moreover, execution of one type of measurement precludes
meaningful discourse about the values of the observable that the observer
did not choose to measure. All this is the essence of “Copenhagenism”.
And it should not be equated with operationalism! The goal of the de-
tector approach to the paradox of observer-dependence was to achieve clarity
on the problem by reverting back to operational definitions of the word “par-
ticle” with respect to the concrete behaviour of particular kinds of detectors
(cf., e.g., DeWitt [1979b], p. 692). But, as with early days of special relativ-
22Why can’t both a Minkowski and a Rindler observer set off in different spacetime
directions and simultaneously measure their respective (finite-subspace or total) number
operators? Would it not, then, be a violation of microcausality when the Minkowski
observer’s measurement disturbs the statistics of the Rindler observer’s measurement out-
comes? No. We must remember that the Minkowski particle concept is global, so our
Minkowski observer cannot make a precise measurement of any of her number operators
unless it is executed throughout the whole of spacetime, which would necessarily destroy
her spacelike separation from the Rindler observer. On the other hand, if she is content
with only an approximate measurement of one of her number operators in a bounded
spacetime region, it is well-known that simultaneous, nondisturbing “unsharp” measure-
ments of incompatible observables are possible. For an analysis of the case of simultaneous
measurements of unsharp position and momentum, see Busch et al [1995].
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ity and quantum theory, operationalism can serve its purpose and then be
jettisoned. Rindler quanta get their status as such not because they are, by
definition, the sort of thing that accelerated detectors detect. This gets things
backwards. Rindler detectors display Rindler quanta in the Minkowski vac-
uum because they couple to Rindler observables of the field that are distinct
from, and indeed complementary to, Minkowski observables.
Arageorgis [1995] himself, together with his collaborators (Arageorgis et
al [1995]), prefer to characterize inequivalent particle concepts, not as com-
plementary, but incommensurable. At first glance, this looks like a trivial
semantic dispute between us. For instance Glymour, in a recent introduc-
tory text on the philosophy of science, summarizes complementarity using
the language of incommensurability:
Changing the experiments we conduct is like changing concep-
tual schemes or paradigms: we experience a different world. Just
as no world of experience combines different conceptual schemes,
no reality we can experience (even indirectly through our experi-
ments) combines precise position and precise momentum (Salmon
et al [1992], p. 128).
However, philosophers of science usually think of incommensurability as a
relation between theories in toto, not different parts of the same physical
theory. Arageorgis et al maintain that inequivalent quantizations define in-
commensurable theories.
Arageorgis [1995] makes the claim that “the degrees of freedom of the
field in the Rindler model simply cannot be described in terms of the ground
state and the elementary excitations of the degrees of freedom of the field in
the Minkowski model” ([1995], p. 268; our italics). Yet so much of our earlier
discussion proves the contrary. Disjoint representations are commensurable,
via the abstract Weyl algebra they share. The result is that the ground
state of one Fock representation makes definite, if sometimes counterintuitive,
predictions for the “differently complexified” degrees of freedom of other Fock
representations.
Arageorgis et al [2000] offer an argument for incommensurability — based
on Fulling’s “theorem”. They begin by discussing the case where the primed
and unprimed representations are unitarily equivalent. (Notice that they
speak of two different “theorists”, rather than two different observers.)
...while different, these particle concepts can nevertheless be deemed
to be commensurable. The two theorists are just labelling the
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particle states in different ways, since each defines particles of
a given type by mixing the creation and annihilation operators
of the other theorist. Insofar as the primed and unprimed theo-
rists disagree, they disagree over which of two inter-translatable
descriptions of the same physical situation to use.
The gulf of disagreement between two theorists using unitarily
inequivalent Fock space representations is much deeper. If in
this case the primed-particle theorist can speak sensibly of the
unprimed-particle theorist’s vacuum at all, he will say that its
primed-particle content is infinite (or more properly, undefined),
and the unprimed-theorist will say the same of the unprimed-
particle content of the primed vacuum. Such disagreement is
profound enough that we deem the particle concepts affiliated
with unitarily inequivalent Fock representations incommensurable
([2000], p. 26).
The logic of this argument is curious. In order to make Fulling’s “theo-
rem” do the work for incommensurability that Arageorgis et al want it to,
one must first have in hand a rigorous version of the theorem (otherwise
their argument would be built on sand). But any rigorous version, like our
Proposition 10, has to presuppose that there is sense to be made of using
a vector state from one Fock representation to generate a prediction for the
expectation value of the total number operator in another inequivalent repre-
sentation. Thus, one cannot even entertain the philosophical implications of
Fulling’s result if one has not first granted a certain level of commensurability
between inequivalent representations.
Moreover, while it may be tempting to define what one means by “in-
commensurable representations” in terms of Fulling’s characterization of in-
equivalent representations, it is difficult to see the exact motivation for such a
definition. Even vector states in the folium of the unprimed “theorist’s” Fock
representation can fail to assign his total number operator a finite expecta-
tion value (just consider any vector not in the operator’s domain). Yet it
would be alarmist to claim that, were the field in such a state, the unprimed
“theorist” would lose his conceptual grasp on, or his ability to talk about, his
own unprimed kind of quanta! So long as a state prescribes a well-defined
probability measure over the spectral projections of the unprimed “theorist’s”
total number operator — and all states in his and the folium of any primed
theorist’s representation will — we fail to see the difficulty.
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5 Conclusion
Let us return to answer the questions we raised in our introduction.
We have argued that a conservative operationalist about physical observ-
ables is not committed to the physical inequivalence of disjoint representa-
tions, so long as he has no particular attachment to states in a particular
folium being the only physical ones. On the other hand, a liberal about phys-
ical observables, no matter what his view on states, must say that disjoint
representations yield physically inequivalent descriptions of a field. However,
we steadfastly resisted the idea that this means an interpreter of quantum
field theory must say disjoint representations are incommensurable, or even
different, theories.
Distinguishing “potential” from “actual” quanta won’t do to resolve the
paradox of observer-dependence. Rather, the paradox forces us to thoroughly
abandon the idea that Minkowski and Rindler observers moving through the
same field are both trying to detect the presence of particles simpliciter.
Their motions cause their detectors to couple to different incompatible par-
ticle observables of the field, making their perspectives on the field neces-
sarily complementary. Furthermore, taking this complementary seriously
means saying that neither the Minkowski nor Rindler perspective yields the
uniquely “correct” story about the particle content of the field, and that both
are necessary to provide a complete picture.
So “Are Rindler Quanta Real?” This is a loaded question that can be
understood in two different ways.
First, we could be asking “Are Any Quanta Real?” without regard to
inequivalent notions of quanta. Certainly particle detection events, modulo a
resolution of the measurement problem, are real. But it should be obvious by
now that detection events do not generally license na¨ive talk of individuat-
able, localizable, particles that come in determinate numbers in the absence
of being detected.
A fuller response would be that quantum field theory is “fundamentally”
a theory of a field, not particles. This is a reasonable response given that:
(i) the field operators {Φ(f) : f ∈ S} exist in every regular representation;
(ii) they can be used to construct creation, annihilation, and number opera-
tors; and (iii) their expectation values evolve in significant respects like the
values of the counterpart classical field, modulo non-local Bell-type correla-
tions. This “field approach” response might seem to leave the ontology of the
theory somewhat opaque. The field operators, being subject to the canonical
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commutation relations, do not all commute; so we cannot speak sensibly of
them all simultaneously having determinate values! However, the right way
to think of the field approach, compatible with complementary, is to see it as
viewing a quantum field as a collection of correlated “objective propensities”
to display values of the field operators in more or less localized regions of
spacetime, relative to various measurement contexts. This view makes room
for the reality of quanta, but only as a kind of epiphenomenon of the field
associated with certain functions of the field operators.
Second, we could be specifically interested in knowing whether it is sen-
sible to say that Rindler, as opposed to just Minkowski, quanta are real. An
uninteresting answer would be ‘No’ — on the grounds that quantum field
theory on flat spacetime is not a serious candidate for describing our actual
universe, or that the Rindler representation is too “pathological”. But, as
philosophers, we are content to leave to the physicists the task of deciding
the question “Are Rindler Quanta Empirically Verified?”. All we have tried
to determine (to echo words of van Fraassen) is how the world could possibly
be if both the Rindler and Minkowski representations were “true”. We have
argued that the antecedent of this counterfactual makes perfect sense, and
that it forces us to view Rindler and Minkowski quanta as complementary.
Thus, Rindler and Minkowski would be equally amenable to achieving “re-
ality status” provided the appropriate measurement context is in place. As
Wald has put it:
Rindler particles are “real” to accelerating observers! This shows
that different notions of “particle” are useful for different purposes
([1994], p. 116).
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Appendix
Proposition 4. Under the liberal approach to observables, φ (factorial) and
π (irreducible) are physically equivalent representations of W only if they are
quasi-equivalent.
Proof. By hypothesis, the bijective mapping αmust map the self-adjoint part
of φ(W)′′ onto that of π(W)′′. Extend α to all of φ(W)′′ by defining
α(X) := α(Re(X)) + iα(Im(X)), X ∈ φ(W)′′. (72)
Clearly, then, α preserves adjoints.
Recall that a family of states S0 on a C
∗-algebra is called full just in
case S0 is convex, and for any A ∈ A, ρ(A) ≥ 0 for all ρ ∈ S0 only if
A ≥ 0. By hypothesis, there is a bijective mapping β from the “physical”
states of φ(W)′′ onto the “physical” states of π(W)′′. According to both
the conservative and liberal construals of physical states, the set of physical
states includes normal states. Since the normal states are full, the domain
and range of β contain full sets of states of the respective C∗-algebras.
By condition (22) and the fact that the domain and range of β are full
sets of states, α arises from a symmetry between the C∗-algebras φ(W)′′
and π(W)′′ in the sense of Roberts & Roepstorff ([1969], Sec. 3).23 Their
Propositions 3.1 and 6.3 then apply to guarantee that α must be linear
and preserve Jordan structure (i.e., anti-commutator brackets). Thus α is a
Jordan ∗-isomorphism.
Now both φ(W)′′ and π(W)′′ = B(Hπ) are von Neumann algebras, and
the latter has a trivial commutant. Thus KR ([1997], Ex. 10.5.26) applies,
and α is either a ∗-isomorphism or a ∗-anti-isomorphism, that reverses the
order of products. However, such reversal is ruled out, otherwise we would
have, using the Weyl relations (10),
α(φ(W (f))φ(W (g))) = e−iσ(f,g)/2α(φ(W (f + g))), (73)
⇒ α(φ(W (g)))α(φ(W (f))) = e−iσ(f,g)/2α(φ(W (f + g))), (74)
⇒ π(W (g))π(W (f)) = e−iσ(f,g)/2π(W (f + g)), (75)
⇒ eiσ(f,g)/2π(W (f + g)) = e−iσ(f,g)/2π(W (f + g)), (76)
23Actually, they consider only symmetries of a C∗-algebra onto itself, but their results
remain valid for our case.
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for all f, g ∈ S. This entails that the value of σ on any pair of vectors is
always is a multiple of 2π which, since σ is bilinear, cannot happen unless
σ = 0 identically (and hence S = {0}). It follows that α is in fact a ∗-
isomorphism. And, by condition (21), α must map φ(A) to π(A) for all
A ∈ W. Thus φ is quasi-equivalent to π.
Proposition 6. When S is infinite-dimensional, π(W[S, σ]) contains no
non-trivial bounded functions of the total number operator on F(SJ).
Proof. For clarity, we suppress the representation map π. Suppose that F :
N 7→ C is a bounded function. We show that if F (N) ∈ W, then F (n) =
F (n+ 1) for all n ∈ N.
The Weyl operators on F(SJ) satisfy the commutation relation (BR
[1996], Prop. 5.2.4(1,2)):
W (g)Φ(f)W (g)∗ = Φ(f)− σ(g, f)I. (77)
Using Eqns. (26) and (37), we find
W (g)a∗(f)W (g)∗ = a∗(f) + 2−1/2i(g, f)JI, (78)
and from this, [W (g), a∗(f)] = 2−1/2i(g, f)JW (g). Now let ψ ∈ F(SJ) be in
the domain of a∗(f). Then a straightforward calculation shows that
〈a∗(f)ψ,W (g)a∗(f)ψ〉
= 2−1/2i(g, f)J〈a∗(f)ψ,W (g)ψ〉+ 〈a(f)a∗(f)ψ,W (g)ψ〉. (79)
Let {fk} be an infinite orthonormal basis for SJ , and let ψ ∈ F(SJ)
be the vector whose n-th component is P+(f1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ fn) and whose other
components are zero. Now, for any k > n, we have a(fk)a
∗(fk)ψ = (n+1)ψ.
Thus, Eqn. (79) gives
〈a∗(fk)ψ,W (g)a∗(fk)ψ〉
= 2−1/2i(g, fk)J〈a∗(fk)ψ,W (g)ψ〉+ (n+ 1)〈ψ,W (g)ψ〉. (80)
Hence,
lim
k→∞
〈a∗(fk)ψ,W (g)a∗(fk)ψ〉 = (n+ 1)〈ψ,W (g)ψ〉. (81)
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Since W is generated by the W (g), Eqn. (81) holds when W (g) is replaced
with any element in W. On the other hand, ψ is an eigenvector with eigen-
value n for N while a∗(fk)ψ is an eigenvector with eigenvalue n + 1 for N .
Thus, 〈ψ, F (N)ψ〉 = F (n)‖ψ‖2 while
〈a∗(fk)ψ, F (N)a∗(fk)ψ〉 = F (n+ 1) ‖a∗(fk)ψ‖2 (82)
= (n+ 1)F (n+ 1) ‖ψ‖2, (83)
for all k > n. Thus, the assumption that F (N) is in W (and hence satisfies
(81)) entails that F (n+ 1) = F (n).
Proposition 7. The Minkowski and Rindler representations of W⊳ are dis-
joint.
Proof. By Horuzhy ([1988], Thm. 3.3.4), πω⊳
M
(W⊳)′′ is a “type III” von Neu-
mann algebra which, in particular, contains no atomic projections. Since πω⊳
R
is irreducible and πω⊳
M
factorial, either πω⊳
R
and πω⊳
M
are disjoint, or they are
quasi-equivalent. However, since πω⊳
R
(W⊳)′′ = B(F(S(⊳)R)), the weak closure
of the Rindler representation clearly contains atomic projections. Moreover,
∗-isomorphisms preserve the ordering of projection operators. Thus there
can be no ∗-isomorphism of πω⊳
M
(W⊳)′′ onto πω⊳
R
(W⊳)′′, and the Minkowski
and Rindler representations of W⊳ are disjoint.
Proposition 8. The Minkowski and Rindler representations of W⊲⊳ are
disjoint.
Proof. Again, we use the fact that πω⊲⊳
M
(W⊳)′′ (≡ πω⊳
M
(W⊳)′′) does not contain
atomic projections, whereas πω⊲⊳
R
(W⊳)′′ (≡ πω⊳
R
(W⊳)′′) does. Suppose, for
reductio ad absurdum, that ω⊲⊳R and ω
⊲⊳
M are not disjoint. Since both these
states are pure, they induce irreducible representations, which therefore must
be unitarily equivalent. Thus, there is a weakly continuous ∗-isomorphism α
from πω⊲⊳
M
(W⊲⊳)′′ onto πω⊲⊳
R
(W⊲⊳)′′ such that α(πω⊲⊳
M
(A)) = πω⊲⊳
R
(A) for each A ∈
W⊲⊳. In particular, α maps πω⊲⊳
M
(W⊳) onto πω⊲⊳
R
(W⊳); and, since α is weakly
continuous, it maps πω⊲⊳
M
(W⊳)′′ onto πω⊲⊳
R
(W⊳)′′. Consequently, πω⊲⊳
M
(W⊳)′′
contains an atomic projection — contradiction.
Proposition 9. If J1, J2 are distinct complex structures on (S, σ), then ωJ1
(resp., ωJ2) predicts dispersion in NJ2 (resp., NJ1).
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Proof. We shall prove the contrapositive. Suppose, then, that there is some
extension ωˆJ1 of ωJ1 to B(F(SJ2)) that is dispersion-free on all bounded func-
tions of NJ2. Then ωˆJ1 is multiplicative for the product of the bounded op-
erator e±itNJ2 with any other element of B(F(SJ2)) (KR [1997], Ex. 4.6.16).
Hence, by Eqn. (43),
ωJ1(W (cos t+ sin tJ2f)) = ωˆJ1
(
e−itNJ2πωJ2 (W (f))e
itNJ2
)
(84)
= ωˆJ1(e
−itNJ2 )ωJ1(W (f)) ωˆJ1(e
itNJ2 ) (85)
= ωJ1(W (f)), (86)
for all f ∈ S and t ∈ R. In particular, we may set t = π/2, and it follows that
ωJ1(W (J2f)) = ωJ1(W (f)) for all f ∈ S. Since e−x is a one-to-one function
of x ∈ R, it follows from (36) that
(f, f)J1 = (J2f, J2f)J1, f ∈ S, (87)
and J2 is a real-linear isometry of the Hilbert space SJ1. We next show that
J2 is in fact a unitary operator on SJ1.
Since J2 is a symplectomorphism, Im(J2f, J2g)J1 = Im(f, g)J1 for any two
elements f, g ∈ S. We also have
|f + g|2J1 = |f |2J1 + |g|2J1 + 2Re(f, g)J1, (88)
|J2f + J2g|2J1 = |J2f |2J1 + |J2g|2J1 + 2Re(J2f, J2g)J1 (89)
= |f |2J1 + |g|2J1 + 2Re(J2f, J2g)J1, (90)
using the fact that J2 is isometric. But J2(f + g) = J2f + J2g, since J2 is
real-linear. Thus,
|J2f + J2g|2J1 = |J2(f + g)|2J1 = |f + g|2J1, (91)
using again the fact that J2 is isometric. Cancellation with Eqns. (88) and
(90) then gives Re(f, g)J1 = Re(J2f, J2g)J1. Thus, J2 preserves the inner
product between any two vectors in SJ1. All that remains to show is that J2
is complex-linear. So let f ∈ SJ1. Then,
(J2(if), J2g)J1 = (if, g)J1 = −i(f, g)J1 = −i(J2f, J2g)J1 = (iJ2f, J2g)J1,
(92)
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for all g ∈ H. Since J2 is onto, it follows that (J2(if), g)J1 = (iJ2f, g)J1 for
all g ∈ H and therefore J2(if) = iJ2f .
Finally, since J2 is unitary and J
2
2 = −I, it follows that J2 = ±iI = ±J1.
However, if J2 = −J1, then
−σ(f, J1f) = σ(f, J2f) ≥ 0, f ∈ S, (93)
since J2 is a complex structure. Since J1 is also a complex structure, it follows
that σ(f, J1f) = 0 for all f ∈ S and S = {0}. Therefore, J2 = J1.
Proposition 10. A pair of Fock representations πωJ1 , πωJ2 are unitarily
equivalent if and only if ωJ1 assigns NJ2 a finite value (equivalently, ωJ2
assigns NJ1 a finite value).
Proof. S may be thought of as a real Hilbert space relative to either of the
inner products µ1, µ2 defined by
µ1,2(·, ·) := Re(·, ·)J1,2 = σ(·, J1,2·). (94)
We shall use Van Daele and Verbeure’s [1971] Theorem 2: πωJ1 , πωJ2 are
unitarily equivalent if and only if the positive operator −[J1, J2]+ − 2I on S
is a trace-class relative to µ2. (Since unitary equivalence is symmetric, the
same “if and only if” holds with 1↔ 2.)
As we know, we can build any number operator NJ2(f) (f ∈ S) on HωJ1
by using the complex structure J2 in Eqns. (37). In terms of field operators,
the result is
NJ2(f) = 2
−1(Φ(f)2 + Φ(J2f)
2 + i[Φ(f),Φ(J2f)]). (95)
Observe that NJ2(J2f) = NJ2(f), which had better be the case, since NJ2(f)
represents the number of J2-quanta with wavefunction in the subspace of SJ2
generated by f . The expectation value of an arbitrary “two-point function”
in J1-vacuum is given by
〈ΩωJ1 , φ(f1)φ(f2)ΩωJ1 〉 (96)
= (−i)2 ∂2
∂t1∂t2
ωJ1(W (t1f1)W (t2f2))|t1=t2=0 (97)
= − ∂2
∂t1∂t2
exp(−1
2
t1t2(f1, f2)J1 − 14t21(f1, f1)J1 − 14 t22(f2, f2)J1)|t1=t2=0 (98)
= 1
2
(f1, f2)J1, (99)
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invoking (35) in the first equality, and the Weyl relations (10) together with
Eqns. (26), (36) to obtain the second. Plugging Eqn. (99) back into (95)
and using (94) eventually yields
〈ΩωJ1 , NJ2(f)ΩωJ1 〉 = 2−2µ2(f, (−[J1, J2]+ − 2I)f). (100)
Next, recall that on the Hilbert space HωJ2 , NJ2 =
∑∞
k=1NJ2(fk), where
{fk} ⊆ SJ2 is any orthonormal basis. Let ω̂J1 be any extension of ωJ1 to
B(HωJ2 ). The calculation that resulted in expression (100) was done inHωJ1 , however, only finitely many-degrees of freedom were involved. Thus the
Stone-von Neumann uniqueness theorem ensures that (100) gives the value
of each individual ω̂J1(NJ2(fk)). Since for any finite m,
∑m
k=1NJ2(fk) ≤ NJ2
as positive operators, we must also have
m∑
k=1
ω̂J1(NJ2(fk)) = ω̂J1
(
m∑
k=1
NJ2(fk)
)
≤ ω̂J1(NJ2). (101)
Thus, ω̂J1(NJ2) will be defined just in case the sum
∞∑
k=1
ω̂J1(NJ2(fk)) =
∞∑
k=1
ω̂J1(NJ2(J2fk)) (102)
converges. Using (100), this is, in turn, equivalent to
∞∑
k=1
µ2(fk, (−[J1, J2]+ − 2I)fk) +
∞∑
k=1
µ2(J2fk, (−[J1, J2]+ − 2I)J2fk) <∞.
(103)
However, it is easy to see that {fk} is a J2-orthonormal basis just in case
{fk, J2fk} forms an orthonormal basis in S relative to the inner product
µ2. Thus, Eqn. (103) is none other than the statement that the operator
−[J1, J2]+ − 2I on S is trace-class relative to µ2, which is equivalent to the
unitary equivalence of πωJ1 , πωJ2 . (The same argument, of course, applies
with 1↔ 2 throughout.)
Proposition 11. If ρ is a regular state of W disjoint from the Fock state
ωJ , then infF∈F
{
Prob ρ(NF ∈ [0, n])
}
= 0 for every n ∈ N.
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Proof. Suppose that ωJ and ρ are disjoint; i.e., F(ωJ) ∩ F(ρ) = ∅. First,
we show that D(nρ) = {0}, where nρ is the quadratic form on Hρ which, if
densely defined, would correspond to the total J-quanta number operator.
Suppose, for reductio ad absurdum, that D(nρ) contains some unit vector
ψ. Let ω be the state of W defined by
ω(A) = 〈ψ, πρ(A)ψ〉 , A ∈ W. (104)
Since ω ∈ F(ρ), it follows that ω is a regular state of W (since ρ itself
is regular), and that ω 6∈ F(ωJ). Let P be the projection onto the closed
subspace in Hρ generated by the set πρ(W)ψ. If we let Pπρ denote the
subrepresentation of πρ on PHρ, then (Pπρ, PHρ) is a representation of W
with cyclic vector ψ. By the uniqueness of the GNS representation, it follows
that (Pπρ, PHρ) is unitarily equivalent to (πω,Hω). In particular, since Ωω
is the image in Hω of ψ ∈ PHρ, D(nω) contains a vector cyclic for πω(W)
in Hω. However, by BR ([1996], Thm. 4.2.14, (3) ⇒ (1)), this implies that
ω ∈ F(ωJ) — a contradiction. Therefore, D(nρ) = {0}.
Now suppose, again for reductio ad absurdum, that
inf
F∈F
{
Prob ρ(NF ∈ [0, n])
}
6= 0. (105)
Let EF := [Eρ(F )]([0, n]) and let E :=
∧
F∈FEF . Since the family {EF} of
projections is downward directed (i.e., F ⊆ F ′ implies EF ≥ EF ′), we have
0 6= inf
F∈F
{〈Ωρ, EFΩρ〉} = 〈Ωρ, EΩρ〉 = ‖EΩρ‖2. (106)
Now since EFEΩρ = EΩρ, it follows that
[nρ(F )](EΩρ) ≤ n, (107)
for all F ∈ F. Thus, EΩρ ∈ D(nρ) and D(nρ) 6= {0} — contradicting the
conclusion of the previous paragraph.
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